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COMMENTS
PROTECTING "DONOR INTENT"
IN CHARITABLE FOUNDATIONS: WAYWARD TRUSTEESHIP
AND THE BARNES FOUNDATION
CHRIS ABBINANTEt
"Well, if George could not get the fish, the fish would not get the cake.
George would eat it. He liked cake too. He would find another way to
get a fish."'
INTRODUCTION
Philanthropy-"The effort or inclination to increase the well-
being of humankind, as by charitable aid or donations."2 This
Comment addresses one of the many forms of philanthropy-the
charitable foundation-also known as the charitable trust. Although
different types of charitable foundations exist, this Comment uses the
term generally to designate institutions established through private
wealth, devoted to public purposes and intended to be perpetual in
nature!
The twentieth century has seen the rise of the foundation as a
crucial and widely used vehicle for philanthropic activity.4  The
t B.B.A. 1994, University of Notre Dame; J.D. Candidate 1997, University of Penn-
sylvania. I would like to thank the members of the Law Review who provided sugges-
tions and carefully edited my Comment. Thanks also to Russell P. Kanjorski for his
insightful ideas and to Professors Bruce H. Mann and William C. Tyson for their re-
views of and contributions toward this Comment. Finally, special thanks to my family,
especially my wife, Martha, who allowed me to keep my research materials scattered
throughout our living room for months before threatening to throw them and me out.
Margret & H.A. Rey, Curious George Ries a Kite, in THE COMPLETE ADVENTURES OF
CURIOUS GEORGE 201, 245 (1995).
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICrIONARYOFTHE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1359 (3d ed. 1992).
3 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 234 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "charitable founda-
tion"); EDITH L. FISCH ET AL., CHARITIES AND CHARITABLE FOUNDATIONS § 36, at 35-36
(1974) (same). For a more detailed definition of the charitable trust, see infra Part
ILA.
4 See Teresa Odendahl, Independent Foundations and Wealthy Donors: An Overview, in
AMERICA'S WEALTHY AND THE FUTURE OF FOUNDATIONS 1, 1 (Teresa Odendahl ed.,
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growth of charitable trusts coincided with the Industrial Revolution.
Industrialization allowed entrepreneurs and opportunists to develop
massive personal fortunes. Capitalists such as Henry Ford, John D.
Rockefeller and Andrew Carnegie amassed incredible wealth in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.5 These men and others
of similar means recognized the value of charitable trusts as instru-
ments that allowed them to donate funds for the public welfare while
maintaining control over the use of those funds.6 Indeed, these mul-
timillionaires and billionaires envisioned the charitable trust as a vehi-
cle through which they could implement their personal charitable
philosophies and affect society in the ways they deemed most benefi-
cial . Beyond the commonly known Ford Foundation and Carnegie
Corporation, there are thousands of smaller foundations that either
donate funds to worthy causes or operate benevolent institutions
themselves.8 One foundation that uses its endowment to support its
own benevolent program is the Barnes Foundation. The Barnes
Foundation is a charitable trust that was created by Dr. Albert Barnes,
a chemist who made a fortune in pharmaceuticals in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries.9 Dr. Barnes established the
Foundation for "the advancement of education and the appreciation
of the fine arts."'0 He donated his priceless collection of Impression-
ist art to the Foundation and built a facility in suburban Philadelphia
1987) [hereinafter AMERICA'S WEALTHY] (stating that early twentieth century entre-
preneurs used foundations to promote their personal visions of society).
See id.
6 See generally FISCH ET AL., supra note 3, § 42, at 41-42 (identifying the motivating
factors behind the creation of charitable trusts).
See Francie Ostrower, The Role of Advisors to the Wealthy, in AMERICA'S WEALTHY,
supra note 4, at 247, 257 ("[C]lients who choose a foundation are those who want to
have an influence over how their wealth will be applied.").
8 SeeJESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M.JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 617
(4th ed. 1990) (noting that, as of 1986, over 24,000 independent foundations in the
United States maintained more than $90 billion in assets and distributed about $6 bil-
lion annually to nonprofit causes); Stephan Salisbury, Private Money, Public Power,
PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 13, 1996, at Al, A26 (stating that, according to the Foundation
Center, as of 1995 there were nearly 39,000 foundations with assets totalling almost
$196 billion).
9 See HOWARD GREENFELD, THE DEVIL AND DR. BARNES 9-29 (1987) (discussing Dr.
Barnes's education in medicine, his career in chemistry, and the fortune he made
through the sale of the drug, Argyrol, which Barnes invented along with fellow scien-
tist Hermann Hille).
30 Barnes Indenture and Agreement, at Introduction (Dec. 6, 1922) (contract es-
tablishing the Foundation, on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review)
[hereinafter Barnes Indenture].
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to house the collection." Barnes also gave millions of dollars for the
maintenance of the collection and the creation of an educational
program centered around the art.
2
Unfortunately, the trustees who control the Barnes Foundation,
as well as the trustees of many other major charitable foundations, are
presently involved in a struggle between their duty to fulfill the inten-
tions of their donors and their desire to dedicate their foundations'
assets to other pursuits. Donors' wishes cannot always be accommo-
dated due to economic changes, modifications of the tax code '4 or
other statutory guidelines affecting foundations, evolving societal
needs, or a host of other unforeseeable circumstances. '5 Under cer-
tain circumstances the law allows the trustees of charitable founda-
tions to deviate from the express instructions of donors. While there
are instances in which trustees cannot follow donors' intentions if
their foundations are to survive or remain viable, 17 there are also
many cases where donors' wishes are disregarded without proper
1 See Robert Hughes, Opening the Barnes Doors, TIME, May 10, 1993, at 61, 62
(discussing Barnes's construction of the Foundation's Merion, Pennsylvania facility
from 900 tons of French limestone).
12 See id. (noting that the Foundation had an initial endowment of $6 million and
discussing Barnes's educational ambitions); see also GREENFELD, supra note 9, at 73-123
(discussing in great detail Barnes's intentions for the Foundation).
13 See Lawrence Osborne, Are a Donor's Wishes Sacred?, NAT'LL.J.,July 3, 1995, at Al
(discussing the controversy surrounding the Barnes Foundation-in particular, the
question of whether the trustees deviated from Dr. Barnes's instructions); see also
Brigid McMenamin, DonorBezvare, FORBES, Feb. 13, 1995, at 172, 172 (noting that trus-
tees who control foundations often disregard the intentions of the founders, including
such major American philanthropists as Henry Ford and Andrew Carnegie).
14 See FISCH ET AL., supra note 3, § 44, at 48-49 (discussing the implications of the
Tax Reform Act of 1969 on charitable foundations).
15 See, e.g., Trammell v. Elliott, 199 S.E.2d 194, 197-99 (Ga. 1973) (discussing the
use of illegal racial classifications in the establishment of an educational scholarship
fund). The Trammell court found that the trust could be modified to exclude the ille-
gal classification as a criterion for receiving the charitable grant. See id. at 199. In In re
Estate of Tomlinson, 359 N.E.2d 109, 110-13 (Il. 1976), the court held that money be-
queathed to the Cancer Research Fund, a nonexistent entity, could be given to the
American Cancer Society, which sponsors cancer research.
16 See FISCH ET AL., supra note 3, §§ 561-89, at 413-69 (discussing the cy pres doc-
trine); see also Cy Pres and Deviation: Current Trends in Application, 8 REAL PROP. PROB. &
TR. J. 391, 391-404 (1973) [hereinafter Cy Pres and Deviation] (discussing the legal
doctrines that allow charitable foundation trustees to deviate from the express or im-
plied mandates of the trust under specific conditions). For further discussion of these
trust law principles, see infra Part 1I.B-C.
'7 See ELAS CLARK ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON GRATUITOUS TRANSFERS 566
(3d ed. 1985) (listing the circumstances, including impossibility, in which courts will
allow deviations from donors' intentions). For discussion of the guidelines for appro-
priate deviations from donor intent, see infra Parts II.B-C.
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cause.'8 The struggle today is to identify those cases where society and
the legal system should not permit deviations from donors' wishes.
The importance of this struggle is simple-society should ensure that
donors' intentions are followed in order to encourage continued
philanthropic activity by the wealthy. Charitable foundations have
proven to be a valuable source of funding for research and education
in the sciences, especially in the fields of medicine and health care.'9
These institutions also provide support for the impoverished, the arts,
religious institutions and community welfare. 0 If potential donors
decide not to fund foundations because the law fails to protect their
intentions, valuable resources will be lost." Given donors' desire for
control over their charitable contributions,2 it is possible that donors
who lose faith in the foundation as a medium for giving might forego
23a large part of their publicly targeted philanthropic activities.
18 See, e.g., In re Estate of Buck, No. 23259 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1986), reprinted in 21
U.S.F. L. REV. 691 (1987) (rejecting an attempt by trustees to deviate from the express
intent of the donor); McMenamin, supra note 13, at 174 (citing a case in which a trus-
tee ignored the wishes of the donor in order to generate greater trustee fees); Martin
Morse Wooster, Advice to Donors: Don't Die, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 1995, at A10 (noting
the improprieties involved in the administration of the Ford, Carnegie and Rocke-
feller foundations). For more detailed discussion of trustee disregard for donor in-
tent, see infra Part III.
19 See FISCH ET AL., supra note 3, §§ 296-307, 322-23, at 259-79 (discussing the con-
tributions made by charitable trusts to education and research); Teresa Odendahl,
Foundations and the Nonprofit Sector, in AMERICA'S WEALTHY, supra note 4, at 27, 35-39
(noting the dollar value of funds given to research and medicine).
Fair consideration of the merits of charitable trusts demands that this Comment
recognize not only the benefits society gains from charitable trusts, but also the bene-
fits these instruments provide for donors. Charitable trusts are a type of bargain be-
tween the public and the philanthropist. In return for donating her wealth for the
betterment of the public welfare, the creator of a foundation is afforded preferred tax
status as to her donated funds, and is allowed to dictate the charitable use of those
funds into perpetuity. For further discussion of the benefits accruing to the donor of
a charitable trust, see infra Part II.A.
N See FISCH ET AL., supra note 3, §§ 272-83, 333-36, at 243-58, 281-88; Odendahl,
supra note 19, at 35-39; see also Ralph Cipriano et al., Huge Grants to Boost Park and Li-
bray, PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 23, 1996, at Al (detailing the William Penn Foundation's
$44 million grant to Philadelphia's libraries and parks).
21 See generally F. EMERSON ANDREWS, PHILANTHROPIC FOUNDATIONS 19 (1956)
(calling foundation funds the "venture capital of philanthropy" providing resources
relatively free from governmental control or interference to organizations that would
otherwise be neglected and underfunded); DUKEMINIER &JOHANSON, supra note 8, at
1 (noting that charitable foundations provide over $6 billion annually in grants).
See Teresa Odendahl, Wealthy Donors and Their Charitable Attitudes, in AMERICA'S
WEALTHY, supra note 4, at 223, 230.
23 SeeRob Atkinson, ReformingCy Pres Reform, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1111, 1121 (1993)
(arguing that "disregarding donor intent will have an adverse effect on charitable giv-
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This Comment examines the problem of donative intent using
the Barnes case as a touchstone. Part I discusses the history of the
Barnes Foundation, from the purposes behind the Foundation's es-
tablishment and the wishes of its creator, to the dilemma that the
Foundation now faces. This Part argues that the trustees of the
Foundation violated their duties by neglecting the wishes of the late
Dr. Barnes. In Part II, this Comment outlines the legal doctrines and
precedents that control the administration of charitable trusts and
deviations from donor intent. Part III details some other present-day
situations where donor intent is regularly and wrongfully disregarded
by the trustees of charitable foundations. These examples are includ-
ed for comparison with the Barnes case, noting the legal and circum-
stantial differences, but focusing on the underlying similarities-spe-
cifically, the disregard for the wishes of the donor. In Part IV, this
Comment examines the reasons why society should value donor in-
tent and argues that the trustees of charitable foundations should be
held to a higher level of accountability in upholding the intentions of
donors. Finally, Part V contains recommendations on how philan-
thropists and the law can better preserve and protect donor intent.
I. THE BARNES FOUNDATION: PAST AND PRESENT CONTROVERSIES
A. Albert Barnes and the Establishment of His Foundation
Dr. Albert Barnes (1872-1951) was a Philadelphian and a gradu-
ate of the University of Pennsylvania Medical School. Barnes and
German scientist, Hermann Hille, developed the pharmaceutical
24product Argyrol. Through the sale of Argyrol, Barnes quickly be-
came a wealthy man.25 With his financial status secure, Barnes de-
voted most of his time to his passion-art.2c Because Barnes believed
that he was not much of an artist, he collected the works of others.
Barnes amassed a collection of Impressionist art that is enormous in
ing").
24 See THE BARNES FOUNDATION: A VISION SHARED (1996) [hereinafter A VISION
SHARED]. Argyrol is a silver nitrate compound that was marketed by Barnes as an anti-
septic for the treatment of infections. See GREENFELD, supra note 9, at 16-17 (1987).
See GREENFELD, supra note 9, at 15-29 (discussing Barnes's tumultuous but highly
successful entrepreneurial business).
26 See MARTIN M. WOOSTER, THE GREAT PHILANTHROPISTS & THE PROBLEM OF
"DONOR INTENT" 43 (1994) (noting that by 1910 Barnes was able to forego his chemis-
try career and pursue other passions such as art and philanthropy); see also A VISION
SHARED, supra note 24 (discussing Barnes's interest in art, philosophy and psychol-
ogy).
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volume and impressive in quality." Although his collection is now
considered priceless, Barnes bought most of his paintings before they
were valued by the art world. 8
As his collection grew, so did Barnes's contempt for his peers in
the art world and the upper class.! Barnes felt slighted by the gentry
of Philadelphia, and in response he disassociated himself from his
contemporaries.30 He expressed his bitterness by writing insulting let-
ters and engaging in personal feuds with those he deemed detractors
or enemies.3' Barnes's ultimate act of disassociation was his response
32to those who sought to view his collection.
1. The Foundation's Origin
In 1922, Barnes created his Foundation.3 The Foundation was
established to house Barnes's collection, 4 but contrary to what would
seem obvious, the Foundation's primary purpose was not to serve as a
public museum.3* In fact, Barnes intentionally placed strict limita-
27 See Hughes, supra note 11, at 62 (noting that the Foundation began with over
700 paintings including 69 CGzannes, 60 Matisses, 44 Picassos and 180 Renoirs); see also
Paul Richard, To Sell or Not to Sel" Philadelphia's Barnes Battk WASH. PosT, Apr. 28,
1991, at GI (stating that the Barnes collection is among the most valuable in Amer-
ica); WOOSTER, supra note 26, at 44 (noting that besides its extensive Impressionist col-
lection, the Foundation also owned ancient African and Chinese art).
28 See GREENFELD, supra note 9, at 89-102 (detailing the harsh reactions that
Barnes's collection initially received from American art critics); see also Hughes, supra
note 11, at 63 (noting that in the early twentieth century modern art was looked upon
with great disdain).
See GREENFELD, supra note 9, at 89-102 (discussing Barnes's reaction to the nega-
tive responses that were voiced at the early exhibitions of his collection). The im-
mense initial criticism Barnes received from American audiences left him bitter. See
id. at 96 ("He had been hurt and stunned by the ignorance and insensitivity of the
men and women who called themselves art critics, and he never forgave them.").
so See id. at 118-35 (discussing Barnes's failed attempts to establish relationships
with mainstream institutions and the resulting effects such failures had on Barnes's
uncompromisingly rigid policy of restricted access to his Foundation).
Included in this category were "journalists, art critics, dealers, other collectors,
and other millionaires, representatives of the world of conservative academia[,] ... all
those who had offended him in the past." Id. at 129.
32 See id. (noting that Barnes refused to admit anyone on his blacklist and uncom-
promisingly restricted the admission of all members of high society and the art world).
3 See id. at 73.
34 See Barnes Indenture, supra note 10, at Introduction ("Whereas, Donor is the
owner of a valuable collection of works of art... which it is intended shall become the
proerty of Donee and shall be placed in the gallery to be erected....").
See Osborne, supra note 13, at A24 (noting that the "stunning collection was des-
tined to be not a public museum but a school of art education of [Barnes's] devis-
ing").
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dons on public access to the collection .r Barnes envisioned the
Foundation as an educational institution, established for instruction
in his own philosophy of art.3 7 Barnes's theories about art education
reflected the views of philosopher John Dewey, Barnes's friend and
mentor."' Dewey implemented these ideas as the Foundation's first
director of art education.
The Indenture40 that Barnes created to govern the Foundation
detailed the proper function of the Foundation and contained many
restrictions upon the use and administration of the collection.4' In
addition to the aforementioned guidelines which restricted public ac-
36 The Foundation's Indenture, last amended during Barnes's lifetime in 1946,
allowed the general public to visit the collection only on Saturdays from September
through June, and never in July and August. See Barnes Indenture, supra note 10, art.
IX, 30 (as amended Apr. 30, 1946). By 1995, the Foundation was open to the public
three-and-a-half days per week. See In reBarnes Found., No. 3231 Phila. 1995, 1996 Pa.
Super. LEXIS 3155, at *4 n.3 & *6-7 (Pa. Super. Ct. Sept. 12, 1996) (noting prior court
orders which had opened the Foundation for two-and-a-half days per week and order-
ing another amendment to the Indenture which would provide for an additional day
of public access).
37 The Indenture states:
Donor makes these provisions and stipulations for the reason that said art gal-
lery is founded as an educational experiment under the principles of modern
psychology as applied to education, and it is Donor's desire during his life-
time.., to perfect the plan so that it shall be operative for the spread of the
principles of democracy and education after the death of the Donor....
Barnes Indenture, supra note 10, art. IX, 1 29. Barnes reiterated his instructions
throughout the Indenture. "This means specifically that The Barnes Foundation is to
be maintained perpetually for education in the appreciation of the fine arts and not as
a school for instruction in painting, drawing, sculpturing .... " Id. 1 34 (as amended
Apr. 30, 1946).
3s See Hughes, supra note 11, at 61 ("[Barnes's] intellectual mentor was the educa-
torJohn Dewey, whose book Democracy and Education formed his ideas about educa-
tion for 'the masses' through art."). Consistent with his desire to educate "the masses"
and to disassociate himself from the upper class, Barnes intended for the Foundation
to become an educational facility which would primarily benefit the "plain peo-
ple. . men and women who gain their livelihood by daily toil in shops, factories."
Barnes Indenture, supra note 10, art IX, 1 30 (as amended Apr. 30, 1946); see also
Hughes, supra note 11, at 63 (describing Barnes's sympathy for the working class).
q9 SeeA VISION SHARED, supra note 24.
40 A trust indenture is "[t]he document which contains the terms and conditions
which govern the conduct of the trustee and the rights of the beneficiaries" of a trust.
BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 1515.
41 See, e.g., Barnes Indenture, supra note 10, art IX, 1 13 ("All the paintings shall
remain in exactly the places they are at the time of the death of Donor...."); Id. 1 33
("[A~t no time after the death of said Donor, shall there be held in any build-
ing... any society functions commonly designated receptions .... dinners, ban-
quets .... whether such functions be private or public.").
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42
cess to the collection, the Indenture outlined a severely limited in-
vestment policy for the Foundation's endowment.4 The Indenture
strictly forbade charging entrance fees to the collection,4 the con-
struction of new buildings on the Foundation's premises, and the
loan or sale of any of the paintings under any circumstances short of
physical deterioration." In an amendment to the Indenture, Barnes
mandated that Articles I, II, IV, V and IX were "unamendable and
shall never be amended in any manner whatsoever. ' 46 These restric-
tions highlight the rigid and peculiar nature of Dr. Barnes's persona
and his philanthropic ideology. The question of whether the trustees
have the duty to adhere to these extreme guidelines is the cause of
the controversies that have long cast a shadow over the Foundation's
existence.
2. The Foundation's History
After Barnes's death in 1951, he left control of the Foundation to
his wife, Laura. Following her death in 1966, control of the Founda-
tion passed, in accordance with Barnes's wishes, to trustees appointed
by Lincoln University, a small, African-American institution in Lin-
48coln University, Pennsylvania. In 1961, the Foundation agreed to
open its doors to the public twice a week due to a court order and the
threat of revocation of its tax-exempt status,49 and three times a week
following Laura Barnes's death.50
42 See id. 30.
43 See id. 1 27 (mandating that the Foundation's funds be invested only in low-
yielding government securities).
See id. 1 30. The Court of Common Pleas amended the Indenture allowing the
trustees to charge five dollars for admission to the Foundation. See In re Barnes Found.,
No. 3231 Phila. 1995, 1996 Pa. Super. LEXIS 3155, at *6-7 (Pa. Super. Ct. Sept. 12,
1996) (affirming the decision of the Court of Common Pleas).
45 See Barnes Indenture, supra note 10, art. IX, 1 9-10.
Id. at art. X. Article IX, paragraph 5 says in part: "Donee expressly convenants
and agrees that in consideration of the making of this agreement... Donee will take
and hold the property so comprehended and covered in conformity with the following
express convenants and agreements [i.e., the rest of the Indenture] and will strictly and
faithfully observe and perform the same." Id. at art. IX, 1 5 (emphasis added).
48 See Hughes, supra note 11, at 63.
8 See id.
49 See GREENFELD, supra note 9, at 289. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted
that "if the gallery was open to only a selected, restricted few, it was not a public insti-
tution; and that if it was not a public institution, it was not entitled to tax exemption."
Id. at 288-89. For further discussion on the tax exemptions afforded charitable foun-
dations, see infra Part IIA
50 See GREENFELD, supra note 9, at 289.
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Aside from the change in public access and a few minor altera-
tions, the Foundation was administered according to Barnes's wishes
throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Adherence to Barnes's intentions
was due in large part to the tight-fisted control held by the last trus-
tees Barnes had personally appointed, particularly Violette deMazia.'5
Upon Mrs. deMazia's death in 1988, Lincoln University gained the
sole right to appoint the Foundation's trustees. 2 By the appointment
of Lincoln's trustees, Richard Glanton, the University's general coun-
sel and a lawyer from Philadelphia, became the Foundation's presi-
dent, a title he continues to hold .
B. The Foundation in the 1990s: A Time of Conflict
By the late 1980s the collection had little professional or private
support. "It had no loyal audience, no generous trustees, no circle of
scholars and museum professionals to give it support.",54 Glanton and
the other trustees argued that the administrative and investment re-
strictions55 that Barnes had placed on the Foundation were hindering
the facility's maintenance and quality. 6 The trustees proposed the
sale of some of the Foundation's "lesser" paintings to raise cash,57
even though the Indenture specifically prohibited the sale of any item
in the collection.58 Once news of the proposed deaccessioning
reached the public, the trustees were harshly criticized by the New
York Times, the Philadelphia Inquirer, art dealers, the Smithsonian and
members of the Barnes advisory committee. This negative sentiment
ultimately caused the trustees to rescind their proposal. '9
Still determined to raise the funds they deemed necessary to sup-
51 SeeHughes, supra note 11, at 63; Osborne, supra note 13, atA24.
2 SeeOsborne, supra note 13, atA24.
5s See id.; Hughes, supra note 11, at 64.
54 Hughes, supra note 11, at 63.
5 See Richard, supra note 27, at G4. For a description of the investment restric-
tions, see Barnes Indenture, supra note 10, art. IX, 27.
56 See Hughes, supra note 11, at 63. It is unrefuted that Barnes's investment poli-
cies hindered the upkeep of the Foundation. Because of Barnes's insistence on utiliz-
ing nonappreciating securities, some of which earned less than three percent annu-
ally, the Foundation's endowment was unable to keep up with inflation. See id.; see also
Richard, supra note 27, at G4.
57 See Hughes, supra note 11, at 64 (noting that "Glanton proposed selling
'redundant' works to pay for the repairs he considered necessary, the cost of which was
estimated at $15 million").
38 See Barnes Indenture, supra note 10, art. IX, 1 10 ("[N]o picture belonging to
the collection shall ever be loaned, sold or otherwise disposed of. ..
See Richard, supra note 27, at G1.
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port the Foundation's existence, the trustees proposed exhibiting a
portion of the collection during a worldwide tour.(n The terms of the
Indenture specifically prohibited such a tour," and many Barnes sup-
porters and art purists vehemently opposed the plan.2 These oppo-
nentso claimed that the trustees never attempted to raise the needed
funds in a manner consistent with Dr. Barnes's wishes."
The court that heard the trustees' petition approved a one-time
deviation from the Indenture's terms, determining that the deviation
was administrative in nature5 and necessary to uphold the greater
purpose of the Foundation-art education. Subsequently, the col-
lection went on tour to venues including Tokyo, Paris and Washing-
ton, D.C.67 The trustees used funds which the exhibition generated to
greatly "improve" the Foundation's facilities. 8
Following the tour's completion, the collection returned to its
Merion, Pennsylvania home. Although the exhibition was a complete
financial success, and the trustees no longer faced the dire financial
GO SeeHughes, supra note 11, at 64.
61 SeeBarnes Indenture, supra note 10, at art. IX, 11 10, 13.
62 See Hughes, supra note 11, at 64.
r3 Some of the most vocal opponents of Glanton's world tour proposal included
New York art dealer Richard Feigen, and Thomas Freudenheim, the Smithsonian In-
stitution's Under Secretary for Museums, both former board members of the Founda-
tion's advisory committee. Additionally, a number of Barnes's present and former
students opposed the tour. See id.
Thomas Freudenheim said of the trustees, "'They never tried to raise money.
Some of us when we were naive, called the Getty Trust to see if they'd be interested
and it could have worked. But it was the [F]oundation which was uninterested!'" Os-
borne, supra note 13, at A24. Robert Hughes noted that "Glanton's critics object to
the fact that the Barnes board never tried other ways of raising money-through chari-
table foundations or private donors. Selling out (as they see it) to the big museums is
an admission of impotence .... " Hughes, supra note 11, at 64.
See In re Barnes Found., No. 58,788, slip op. at 16 (C.P. Ct. Montgomery County,
Pa., Orphans' Ct. Div. July 21, 1992). For an examination of the administrative devia-
tion doctrine in charitable trusts, see infra Part II.C.
W See id. at 3, 7, 13.
67 See Osborne, supra note 13, at A24-A25. It is interesting to note that the court
also granted the trustees' petition to extend the world tour even after the requisite
funds had been raised. See id.
68 SeeJennifer L. White, Note, When It's OK to Sell the Monet: A Trustee-Fiduciay-Duty
Framework for Analyzing the Deaccessioning of Art to Meet Museum Operating Expenses, 94
MIcH. L. REV. 1041, 1062-63 (1996) (stating that the Barnes tour raised over $17 mil-
lion of which $12 million was used to modernize the Foundation's facilities; the re-
maining $5 million went toward its endowment and operating expenses); Kyle York
Spencer, Reopening a Strugglefor Barnes, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 11, 1995, at BI (noting
that the $12 million in renovations included a high-tech security system, improved
lighting, access for the disabled, fire protection and climate control).
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troubles that had motivated their first petition for deviation, the trus-
tees successfully petitioned the court for numerous. other deviations
from Barnes's mandatesW The actions of the trustees remain the sub-
ject of court proceedings and government action.
C. The Misguided Trusteeship of the Barnes Foundation
Albert Barnes and the Indenture he authored were bizarre, even
unsettling. His investment restrictions left the Foundation in a state
of disrepair and unable to independently fund necessary renovations.
Nonetheless, the trustees apparently failed to give adequate consid-
eration to fundraising opportunities that would have been consistent
with the Indenture's conditions.7' The two plans the trustees devised,
deaccessioning some of the art and the world tour, directly violated
69 On September 21, 1995, the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas is-
sued an order amending the Barnes Indenture. The trustees were given greater dis-
cretion to invest the Foundation's endowment and were allowed to expand public
viewing of the Foundation to three-and-a-half days per week at an admissions fee of
five dollars. SeeIn reBarnes Found., No. 3231 Phila. 1995, 1996 Pa. Super. LEXIS 3155,
at *6-7 (Pa. Super. Ct. Sept. 12, 1996). On appeal, the superior court did not grant the
trustees' requests to raise admissions to ten dollars and to allow the gallery to remain
open six days per week. See id. at *15. The superior court, however, reversed the lower
court in part, and further amended the Indenture by permitting the trustees to hold
fundraising events at the Foundation. See id. at *9-11; see also Robert W. Fowler, A Cha-
Cha Near a Cezanne? Court Opens Barnes Door, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 14, 1996, at B1. In
an earlier decision, the superior court also granted the trustees' petition to open the
Foundation during July and August, which the Indenture also explicitly forbade. See
Anne Barnard, Barnes to Open for Summer, PHILA. INQUIRER,July 3, 1996, at BI.
70 See Kyle York Spencer, Barnes Foundation Ordered to Cut Its Hours, PHILA. IN-
QUIRER, Dec. 14, 1995, at B1. The township of Lower Merion, the Foundation's loca-
tion, accused the trustees of transforming the Barnes into an art gallery, which con-
flicts with local zoning provisions that only allow for an educational institution. In an
attempt to lessen the crowds caused by the Foundation's increased popularity, Lower
Merion has ordered the Foundation to meet its zoning requirements by reducing the
length and number of public visitation days. See id.; see also Anne Barnard, Barnes, L.
Merion Go Back to Court over Zoning Dispute, PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 28, 1997, at B3
(noting that the Foundation will appeal a township zoning board decision which
found "that the Barnes had illegally transformed itself from an art appreciation
school ... into a full-fledged museum").
71 See supra note 64 and accompanying text. The decision by the court in the
Barnes case should be viewed in light of principles established by the New Hampshire
Supreme Court. Although not binding precedent, the decision is instructional in this
area of the law: "[D]eviation is allowed only for cogent reasons and only to the extent
necessary to effectuate the primary purpose of the trust...." Jacobs v. Bean, 108 A.2d
559,561 (N.H. 1954). Logic tells us that the deviations undertaken by the Barnes trus-
tees could only be deemed "necessary" if all alternatives permissible under the Inden-
ture were explored and were unavailable.
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the Indenture. 2
Even if the trustees tried and failed to raise the funds they
deemed necessary for the Foundation's continued existence by means
that did not violate the Indenture, the actions that the trustees under-
took and that the courts approved are still inappropriate. Barnes
clearly drafted provisions in the Indenture that instructed the trustees
in the event conditions deteriorated to the point that the collection
and Barnes's system of education became unmanageable. 7 If the
trustees determined that the "educational experiment" (in other
words, the Foundation itself) was a failure,74 they were given the op-
tion of disposing of the collection by gift to another institution,
school or museum.7 5 The Indenture does not provide for the trans-
formation of the Foundation into a museum or for a two-year world
tour76
The trustees' inability to adhere to the conditions77 set forth in
the Indenture constitutes a "failure" of Barnes's vision for the Foun-
dation. Supporters of the trustees' actions argue that the basic pur-
pose of the Foundation is educational and that the proscriptions and
restrictions set forth in the Indenture are merely administrative and
secondary. 8 An examination of Barnes's life and philosophy,79 how-
See supra notes 57-64 and accompanying text.
73 SeeBarnes Indenture, supra note 10, art. IX, 3 82. The Indenture states that the
provisions of the Indenture could only be altered by the written consent of Dr. Barnes
and that after his death no modification was permissible. See id.
74 For a discussion of what constitutes the failure of a foundation as defined by the
law, see infra Part II.B.
73 See Barnes Indenture, supra note 10, art. IX, 13 2.
76 See id. Furthermore, the deviations undertaken by the trustees conflicted with
the interests of the Foundation's intended beneficiaries-the students of the Barnes
Foundation. With the collection on tour for two years, the students were unable to use
the paintings for the intended educational purpose. Pennsylvania law prohibits devia-
tion from a trust that impairs the interests of the trust's beneficiaries. See Lehigh Univ.
v. Hower, 46 A.2d 516, 521 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1946) ("A court may vary specific instruc-
tions given by a testator in his will in order to accomplish the ultimate end which he
had in view, provided such a departure does not impair the interest of any beneficiary
or violate the testator's primary purpose.").
77For a discussion of the conditions that Barnes placed upon the Foundation, see
supra notes 36-46 and accompanying text.
78 The Pennsylvania Superior Court that permitted fundraising at the Barnes also
considered Barnes's restrictions to be mere administrative provisions. See In re Barnes
Found., No. 3231 Phila. 1995, 1996 Pa. Super. LEXIS 3155, at *12-13 (Pa. Super. Ct.
Sept. 12, 1996) (citing the elements necessary to deviate from the administrative pro-
visions of a trust when deciding whether to allow an increase in admissions price).
79 See supra notes 29-39 (discussing Barnes's contempt for his peers and the restric-
tions he placed on the Foundation as part and parcel of his educational philosophy).
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ever, clearly establishes that these conditions are more than just over-
reaching administrative tyranny mandated by Dr. Barnes. The condi-
tions represent Barnes's overarching methodology and his intention
as to how to perpetuate his Foundation. These conditions are man-
datory, non-negotiable terms that the donor deemed necessary to
guide the trustees in their management of his educational designs.
Although unquestionably confining, these rules are integral to
Barnes's charitable contribution. They should be honored to the
fullest extent possible.0
More than anything else, the events subsequent to the collection's
return to Merion highlight the lack of respect the trustees afforded to
Barnes's wishes.8' For example, the trustees successfully petitioned
the court for permission to hold fundraising events in the Founda-
tion's gallery. They expanded public viewing hours into the summer
and increased admissions fees to the Foundation." These actions are
blatant violations of the language of the Indenture as written by Dr.
Barnes."' Saddest of all is that these deviations and the attitudes of
the trustees"' are clear indications that the Barnes Foundation has
80 The one deviation from the terms of the Indenture that seems acceptable as
purely administrative is the modification of the investment policies of the trust. Un-
like the restrictions on the Foundation that deal with viewing privileges, the sale or
loan of any paintings, and the use of the gallery as a public museum, the investment
restrictions do not have any direct relationship to, or bearing on, Barnes's educational
philosophy or his intentions regarding the proper role of the collection.
See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
82 See supra note 69. Prior to the superior court's order amending the Indenture
and thus permitting fundraising events in the Foundation's gallery, the trustees held
fundraising events on the Foundation's grounds. They successfully argued that the
Indenture only prohibited social functions in the Foundation's buildings. See Leonard
W. Boasberg, Court Allows Barnes' Guests at Dinner a Feast for Eyes, Too, PHILA. INQUIRER,
Nov. 9, 1995, at Bi; see also Barnes Indenture, supra note 10, art. IX, 1 33. These
events, although not direct violations of the language of the Indenture, show the trus-
tees' obvious disregard for the wishes of Dr. Barnes.
See supra note 69. Richard F. Glanton, president of the Foundation's board of
trustees, argued that the Foundation is owned by the public and, as such, it should
have a right to fully enjoy it. See EdwardJ. Sozanski, The Bottom Line at the Barnes Foun-
dation: It's Now a Museum, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 19, 1995, at F13. In fact, the Founda-
tion is a private foundation, which must be accessible to the public and serve a charita-
ble purpose in order to maintain its tax status. See id. Under Barnes's wishes, the
Foundation would serve a charitable purpose, education for art appreciation, while
remaining accessible to the public. There is no community ownership of the Founda-
tion 8iving the public unlimited access to the collection.
83 SeeBarnes Indenture, supra note 10, art. IX, 1 30.
See, e.g., Osborne, supra note 13, at A24 ("Mr. Glanton [the Foundation's presi-
dent] ... calls Mr. Barnes' [s] educational views 'hokum.'"). The article also details the
contemptuous relationship between Barnes and Walter Annenberg, another wealthy
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been transformed from an educational institution into a museum.86
In fact, the Lower Merion Township zoning board recently came to
the same conclusion.s
The oddities of Albert Barnes and his visions for the Foundation
may make any sympathy toward the man and his intentions difficult
to foster. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that Barnes was
never under any obligation to donate his collection for the public
welfare in the first place. Respecting his demands and eccentricities
was part of the bargain agreed to when his public charity was accept-
ed. Moreover, objectivity demands that the law separate the bizarre
circumstances surrounding this case from the real issue at hand-the
failure of the legal system of trusteeship to value the wishes of the do-
nor. Valid arguments that illustrate the societal need to respect do-
nors' intentions~s should encourage the law to protect even those
wishes considered irregular or bizarre.
II. THE LAW OF CHARITABLE FOUNDATIONS AND DEVIATIONS FROM
DONORS' WISHES
A. Defining a Charitable Foundation
8
9
"A foundation may be defined as a nongovernmental, nonprofit
organization having a principal fund of its own, managed by its own
trustees or directors, and established to maintain or aid social, educa-
tional, charitable, religious, or other activities serving the common
Philadelphian, whom Glanton made an honorary member of the Barnes advisory
committee. See id. Annenberg has since resigned from the advisory committee. See
Richard, supra note 27, at G4 (noting Annenberg's resignation in early April 1991).
86 See Osborne, supra note 13, at A24 ("'Basically, the Barnes trust was set up to
fund a charitable educational institution. What is happening now is that outsiders are
coming in to turn it into a cash-cow commercial museum against Barnes' [s] express
wishes.'" (quoting Nicholas Tinari, editor of the Barnes Watch newsletter)); Sozanski,
supra note 83, at F13 (writing that the Foundation-under its current management,
with renovations in place and the crowds it attracts-is undoubtedly a museum in-
compatible with the educational mission of its founder, Glanton hopes to draw
120,000 people annually while increasing admission fees and public viewing times).
87 See Barnard, supra note 70, at B3 (noting that, upon this finding, the zoning
board filed a complaint with the Merion County Court requesting that the Foundation
be required to shorten its visiting hours and restrict the number of visitors allowed
weekly).
88 See infra Part IV.
89 I use the terms charitable foundation and charitable trust interchangeably. All
foundations can be legally classified as either charitable trusts, charitable corporations
or charitable associations. SeeFISCH ETAL., supra note 3, § 36, at 35.
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welfare."90 A foundation such as the Barnes Foundation is a privately
created and operated institution that serves the public in some man-
ner.
A charitable trust is distinguishable from a private trust on a
number of grounds. The beneficiaries of a private trust are normally
a small number of identified or identifiable people.9' Thus, society as
a whole has no interest in the trust. In addition, the private trust
must be temporary in nature.
In order for a trust to be considered charitable, the trust must ei-
ther be for the benefit of the community at large or for the benefit of
a class of persons. Trusts that benefit a class of persons must be des-
ignated as an aid to the impoverished, or to education, religion,
health or other charitable purpose.9' Only the charitable trust is ex-
empt from the Rule against Perpetuities ' and, in turn, is "potentially
infinite in duration."94 Finally, for purposes of this Comment, it is
important to realize that "foundations can be divided into those
which give grants to other organizations or individuals, and those
which operate their own programs. ' 9-5
The characteristics or privileges that distinguish foundations are
goANDREWS, supra note 21, at 11.
91 See id. at 48.
92 See DUKEMINIER &JOHANSON, supra note 8, at 587-88 (explaining that a trust is
not charitable merely because it benefits a class of people unless the designated class
falls in one of the aforementioned categories). Andrews notes that although a chari-
table trust may benefit certain individuals, "'it does not go for the purpose of mere en-
richment, but rather to produce a desirable social effect.'" ANDREWS, supra note 21, at
48 (quoting GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 861
(1953)).
93 The classic definition of the Rule Against Perpetuities is that "[njo interest in
real or personal property shall be good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than 21
years after some life in being at the creation of the interest." CAL. CIV. CODE § 715.2
(West 1982). The idea behind the Rule is to limit "dead hand" control and to keep
property marketable and available for the current demand. See CLARK ET AL, supra
note 17, at 744-48; DUKEMINIER &JOHANSON, supra note 8, at 760-64. The Rule gives
grantors some control over their property when devised, but prohibits current prop-
erty owners from controlling the uses of their property indefinitely. See CLARK ET AL.,
supra, at 747-48 (citing LEWIS M. SIMES & ALLAN F. SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE
INTERESTS § 1117 (2d ed. 1956)). The charitable trust exemption from the Rule
Against Perpetuities is significant in that the founder of a charitable trust can deter-
mine how her money or property will be used into perpetuity. Charitable trusts thus
have a greater potential to preserve a donor's intent.
94 Roger G. Sisson, Comment, Relaxing the Dead Hand's Gip: Charitable Efficiency
and the Doctine ofCy Pres, 74 VA. L. REV. 635, 635 (1988).
95ANDREWS, supra note 21, at 151. Most foundations, especially the larger, more
well-known funds like the Ford Foundation, distribute most of their funds through
grants. See id. The Barnes Foundation is an example of an operating foundation.
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also the motivating factors leading to their establishment. ' Specifi-
cally, the foundation allows its creator to provide charitable funding
while retaining control over the distribution and uses of her contribu-
tions." Another important factor is the tax benefits gained by using a
foundation as a vehicle for charitable giving.
This Comment's specific concern regarding charitable founda-
tions is the departure from, or the alteration of, the wishes of philan-
thropists who establish foundations. Legally, these modifications can
be categorized under two headings: (1) the cy pres doctrine; and (2)
administrative deviation.
B. The Cy Pres Doctrine
Cy pres is a shortened form of the phrase cy pres comme possible,
which in Norman French means "as near as possible."'w The main ob-
jective of this charitable trust doctrine is to allow the donor's purpose
to be followed as closely as possible when the donor's specific man-
dates cannot be carried out.00 Cy pres is not a doctrine of convenience
96 See id.
97 See FISCH ETAL., supra note 3, § 42, at 42.
98 The taxation of charitable foundations involves a complex set of rules and regu-
lations. Because these tax consequences are not vital to this discussion, an explana-
tion of these rules is not provided. For a detailed discussion, see Edward Jay Beckwith
& Jana S. DeSirgh, Technical Appendix: Tax Law and Private Foundations, in AMERICA'S
WEALTHY, supra note 4, at 267, 267-93. Generally, the foundation has been a popular
device because it gives the donor some of the tax benefits she would receive in giving
her money to a nonfoundation charity. See FISCH ET AL., supra note 3, § 42, at 42
("However, the role of the statutes ... has probably been overemphasized since the
tax deduction ... is less when he gives his property to a foundation thai when he gives
his property to a non-foundation charity ... ."). For qualified gifts to charity, the In-
ternal Revenue Code grants limited income, gift and estate tax deductions. See Mary
Kay Lundwall, Inconsistency and Uncertainty in the Charitable Purposes Doctrine, 41 WAYNE
L. REV. 1341, 1343-44 (1995) (citing I.R.C. §§ 170, 642(c), 252, 2055 (1987)).
In addition to the preferential tax treatment afforded to charitable trust donors,
charitable trusts themselves qualify as exempt organizations under federal tax law.
Some or all of the income that foundations generate is tax exempt. See THOMAS L.
WATERBURY, MATERIALS ON TRUSTS AND ESTATES 1017-1018 (1986). Tax incentives for
the creation of charitable foundations were curtailed to some degree by the Tax Re-
form Act of 1969 and subsequent legislation. See Beckwith & DeSirgh, supra, at 286-87.
In re Estate of Buck, No. 23259 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1986), reprinted in 21 U.S.F. L.
REV. 691, 747 (1987) (citing GEORGE G. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 431, at 490
(2d ed. 1964)).
100 See id. The cy pres doctrine is traditionally stated as follows:
If property is given in trust to be applied to a particular charitable purpose,
and it is or becomes impossible or impracticable or illegal to carry out the
particular purpose, and if the settlor manifested a more general intention to
devote the property to charitable purposes, the trust will not fail but the court
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that allows courts to vary the terms of a foundation when such modifi-
cation would make the trust more beneficial to the community or to
the foundation itself.' 1 Judicial use of cy pres is reserved for those in-
stances when a court determines that the particulars of a trust can no
longer be followed (the specific intent), that is, when there is failure
of purpose. 2 If the court determines that the foundation can still
effectuate the general charitable intentions of the donor, the court
will allow the trustees to administer the trust through deviation from
the specified instructions of the donor.'03 The proper application of
cy pres supports adherence to donor intent because it attempts to
effectuate the wishes of the donor in the face of previously unfore-
seen obstacles.
General charitable intent is distinguished from the specific intent
of a trust in that the former is "a desire to benefit a charitable pur-
pose or objective rather than any particular object or institution."'0
4
This distinction can best be illustrated through an example: Suppose
a donor instructs her foundation to fund AIDS research being per-
formed at the Mayo Clinic. Five years after the donor's 'death, the
Mayo Clinic ceases its AIDS research. If a court determines that the
donor's general charitable intent was to fund AIDS research, the
court may use cy pres to modify the terms of the trust and allow the
trust to fund AIDS research at other institutions. Suppose, however,
will direct the application of the property to some charitable purpose which
falls within the general charitable intention of the settlor.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTRUSTS § 399 (1959).
101 See In reEstate of Buck, No. 23259 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1986), reprinted in 21 U.S.F. L.
REV. 691, 749-56 (1987) ("The c pres doctrine should not be so distorted by the adop-
tion of subjective ... standards such as 'inefficiency' or 'ineffective' philanthropy to
the extent that it becomes a facile vehicle for charitable trustees to vary the terms of a
trust....").
lr See City of Danville v. Caldwell, 311 S.W.2d 561, 563 (Ky. Ct. App. 1958) (noting
that cy pres will not be applied unless the specified purpose cannot be carried out, and
then only if there is a showing of general charitable intent).
Reasons why the particular purpose mandated by a donor cannot be followed in-
clude: (1) insufficient funds; (2) impossibility; (3) nonexistence of the named benefi-
ciary; and (4) unsuitability of the premises devised for the charitable purpose. See
CLARKETAL, supra note 17, at 566.
103 See Vanessa Laird, Note, Phantom Selves: The Search for a General Charitable Intent
in the Application of the Cy Pres Doctrine, 40 STAN. L. REV. 973, 974 n.3 (1988) ("'[T]he
judicial cy pes doctrine may be resorted to, not to defeat the donor's intention, but to
effectuate it'" (quoting School Dist. No. 70 v. Wood, 13 N.W.2d 153, 157 (Neb.
1944))). Laird also notes that, "[bly making modification of the trust contingent on
the testator's charitable intent, cy pes suggests that, whatever the court does, it does
with the consent of the phantom testator." Id. at 973-74.
FISCH ETAL., supra note 3, § 575, at 438.
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that evidence presented to the court establishes that the donor's spe-
cific and primary intention was that her funds only be used for the
Mayo Clinic's AIDS research. In this instance, cy pres would be inappli-
cable and the court should not modify the terms of the trust. Deter-
mining whether a donor had a general or specific intent is usually
quite difficult because donors rarely foresee or plan for the failure of
their particular intentions or give instruction as to their general chari-
table intent.'05
If a charitable trust can no longer be administered in accordance
with the mandates of the grantor because of impossibility or illegality,
and cy pres is inapplicable, the trust fails.'06 Upon failure, property
held in the trust reverts to the heirs of the donor unless she directed
otherwise in her will.107 A donor may leave instructions for the dispo-
sition of the trust in the event of its failure. In such a case, those
instructions should be determinative of the trust's future course, not
the trustees' belief as to the donor's general charitable intent.' s
Courts have traditionally been conservative in their use of the
105 See id. § 575, at 439 ("The ascertainment of whether a donor had a general or
particular charitable intention is seldom simple, for the donor generally fails to fore-
see the possible failure of his particular purpose.").
106 See id. § 659, at 507 ("Equity has power to terminate when it becomes impossi-
ble, impractical or illegal to carry out the specific charitable purpose of a donor."). In
Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 444 (1970), the Supreme Court held that a trust that was
established to create and maintain a segregated park on a plot of land in Macon,
Georgia, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. The
Court determined that cy pres could not be used to modify the trust to create a deseg-
regated park, because this would have violated the specijfic intent of the donor, Senator
Augustus 0. Bacon. Thus, the trust failed, and the property reverted to the donor's
estate. FISCH ETAL, supra note 3, § 659, at 507-08.
It should be noted that the failure of a trustee to act in accordance with the intent
of the grantor will not cause failure. In such a case, if the trust can be administered in
accordance with the donor's wishes, the court will simply select another trustee. See
FISCH ET AL., supra note 3, §§ 660-61, at 508-10 (discussing failure of a trustee and se-
lection of a new trustee).
107 See FIScH ET AL., supra note 3, § 659, at 508 ("When a disposition can be saved
for charity only by the cy pres doctrine, and that doctrine is not applicable or does not
obtain in the jurisdiction, the property reverts to the heirs of the donor unless he has
made other provision for its disposition." (citations omitted)).
108 See Laird, supra note 103, at 978 ("[I]f the testator made express provision for
the disposition of the trust in the event of failure, such provision is controlling under
cy pres."). This idea has particular relevance to the Barnes case. Although the Barnes
court stated that the deviations it permitted were only administrative, this Comment
argued earlier that those deviations went to the very purpose of the trust. See supra
Part I.C. As such, Barnes's instructions in the event of failure should have been con-
trolling. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text (noting that Barnes called for
the distribution of his collection in the event his educational experiment failed).
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power of cy pres.'O  The prevailing attitude among academics today,
however, is that cy pres should be used more expansively to make
foundations more beneficial to the public in light of changing socie-
tal needs and demands."0
C. The Administrative Deviation Doctrine
Administrative deviation must be distinguished from cy pres be-
cause the two concepts are often mistaken for one another. Devia-
tions from the administrative terms of a trust may be excused when
adherence to those terms would disrupt the specific purposes of the
trust."' Cy pres applies when the issue is whether the court can modify
109 See, e.g., Trust Under the Will of Porter, 447 A.2d 977 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982).
The meaning of the doctrine of cy pres... is, that when a definite function or
duty is to be performed, and it cannot be done in exact conformity with the
scheme of the person or persons who have provided for it, it must be per-
formed with as close approximation to that scheme as reasonably practicable....
Id. at 979 (emphasis added) (quoting Philadelphia v. Heirs of Stephen Girard, 45 Pa.
9, 28 (1863)). The modem trend, however, is toward a narrower interpretation of cy
pres and the expansive use of other trust law doctrines (e.g., administrative deviation,
discussed in the next section) to allow trustees to maintain the operation of charitable
foundations. SeeFISCH ETAL., supra note 3, § 589, at 467 ("The strong desire to sustain
charitable dispositions and entities whenever possible has now outpaced the strictures
of the cy pres doctrine ... ."); see also In re Barnes Found., No. 58,788 (C.P. Ct. Mont-
gomery County, Pa., Orphans' Ct. Div. July 21, 1992). As previously discussed, the is-
sue in the Barnes case arguably concerned the very intentions of the donor, but the
decision ignored any reference to cy pres, using instead the more liberal doctrine of
administrative deviation to modify the trust. Id.
1o See, e.g., C. Ronald Chester, Cy Pres: A Promise Unfulfilled, 54 IND. L.J. 407, 425
(1979) (arguing that courts "will best serve the interests of society in the charitable
trust field by applying cy pres widely and openly as a matter of public policy and by pay-
ing less regard to notions of individual intent"); Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr., Cy Pres: A
Proposal for Chang 47 B.U. L. REV. 153, 195 (1967) (arguing that an expansion of the
cy pres doctrine should be within a court's equity powers); Alex M. Johnson, Jr. & Ross
D. Taylor, Revolutionizing Judicial Interpretation of Charitable Trusts: Applying Relational
Contracts and Dynamic Interpretation to Cy Pres and America's Cup Litigation, 74 IoWA L.
REV. 545, 568 (1989) ("What is needed is a reasoned doctrine for the application of cy
pres which takes into account not only the settIor's intent, but society's interest in the
efficacious utilization of resources in light of changed conditions that occur following
the donor's death.").
In the same vein, some legislators have expanded the use of cy pres under the the-
ory that it is better to sustain charitable gifts than it is to adhere to the strict ideology
behind the doctrine of cy pres. For example, Pennsylvania eliminated the general
charitable intent requirement from its application of cy pres. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 6110 (a) (West Supp. 1996).
I See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTRUsTs § 381 (1959).
The court will direct or permit the trustee of a charitable trust to deviate from
a term of the trust if it appears to the court that compliance is impossible or
illegal, or that owing to circumstances not known to the settlor and not an-
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the specific directions of a charitable foundation in order to uphold
the general intent, whereas administrative deviation is exercised when
the issue concerns the manner in which the trust is managed.'"2 Ad-
ministrative deviation is used to perpetuate the viability of the donor's
specific intentions. Thus, unlike cy pres, there is no need to find a
general charitable intent before permitting the deviation."'
The deviation doctrine has been used to increase the number of
trustees of a trust,114 to permit the mortgaging of charitable prop-
erty,"15 to allow trustees to charge tuition,"6 and to eliminate a racial
restriction. '7 The prerequisites for the usage of the doctrine are not
settled. Some courts have been willing to apply the doctrine only in
cases of near impossibility. "8 The normal practice is to permit devia-
tion when changed circumstances make adherence to the specific
administrative terms of a trust possible but impractical."9
ticipated by him compliance would defeat or substantially impair the accom-
plishment of the purposes of the trust.
Id.
112 See Cy Pres and Deviation, supra note 16, at 398 (noting situations in which de-
viation has been used, such as in the modification of investment restrictions laid out in
a trust document).
113 SeeFISCHETAL., supra note 3, § 547, at 407.
14 See Reagh v. Hamilton, 78 P.2d 555, 558 (Wash. 1938) (upholding a trial court
decree providing for a board of trustees with between three and nine members despite
the fact that the will creating the trust provided for only three individual trustees, be-
cause the decree did not do "violence to the primary object of the testator").
115 See Bond v. Town of Tarboro, 7 S.E.2d 617, 619-20 (N.C. 1940) (finding a
$40,000 mortgage to be within the power of the trustees insofar as it served the pur-
pose of maintaining the trust's assets).
116 See Coffee v. William Marsh Rice Univ., 408 S.W.2d 269, 286 (Tex. Civ. App.
1966) (allowing a deviation in order to permit the charging of tuition and acceptance
of appicants without regard to race).
See Bank of Delaware v. Buckson, 255 A.2d 710, 712, 717 (Del. Ch. 1969)
(finding that a provision of a will naming "white youths" as eligible for a scholarship
was written under a set of circumstances not present at the time the case was heard by
the court, and therefore, the provision was not binding on the trustees).
11 See, e.g., Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v.John Thomasson Constr. Co., 168 S.E.2d
358, 364 (N.C. 1969) (noting that deviation could be used to "modify the terms of a
charitable trust when it appears that some exigency ... or emergency... has arisen
requiring a disregard of a specific provision of the trust... to preserve the trust
estate").
11 See Cy Pres and Deviation, supra note 16, at 402 (citing Petition of Hershey Trust
Co., No. 712 of 1963 (C.P. Ct. Dauphin County, Pa., Orphans' Ct. 1970), which permit-
ted deviation on a finding that the trust requirements had become "'inefficient, cum-
bersome and unresponsive to changing economic situations'").
The terms "impracticability" and "impracticality" are used throughout this
Comment. These terms are not synonymous. The American Heritage Dictiona2y specifi-
cally highlights the difference: "Impracticable applies to a course of action that is im-
possible to carry out or put into practice; impractical... can be weaker in sense,
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The distinction between cy pres and administrative deviation
seems readily identifiable on initial consideration. There are many
instances, however, when the use of either doctrine is justifiable be-
cause it is unclear whether the issue relates to the trust's administra-
tion or its specific purpose.20 For example, Trustees of Dartmouth Col-
lege v. Quincy dealt with a trust established to create and support a
school for the education of women born in Quincy, Massachusetts.
Because the trust did not provide enough funds to meet the costs of
running the school, the trustees decided to admit women from other
towns and to charge them a higher tuition. The court determined
that this modification was administrative in nature and approved the
action.' 2 An equally valid argument could have been made, however,
that modifying the admissions policy affected the very purpose of the
trust. With such a finding, cy pres would have been appropriate, but
only if there was an additional finding of general charitable intent-
that is, the general desire to create a school to educate women.
The preceding example demonstrates the ambiguity present in
many cases in determining whether cy pres or administrative deviation
is the appropriate doctrine. This ambiguity creates the opportunity
for a trustee or a court with a specific agenda to characterize a situa-
tion under the doctrine most beneficial to the desired outcome.123
suggesting that the course of action would... have little practical value." AMERICAN
HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra note 2, at 908. The common
definition of cy pres lists both impracticability and impossibility of purpose as accept-
able reasons for application. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 (1959).
This usage suggests redundancy; however, Black's Law Dictionary notes that
"commercial impracticability" is a "broadened interpretation of the doctrine of impos-
sibility which holds that a party to a contract... will be relieved [of performancel
when the premise.., on which the contract was based no longer exists due to unfore-
seeable events." BLACK'S LAW DIGTIONARY, supra note 3, at 756. The standard has
been further muddled by courts and commentators who list impracticality as grounds
for the application of cy pres. See FIsCH ET AL., supra note 3, § 576, at 442 & n.16, 444
n.21 (listing court holdings that based the use of cy pres on impracticality). As noted in
the text, the use of impracticality in the application of administrative deviation is simi-
larly unsettled. Nevertheless, recognizing the distinction between these terms is vital
to the proposal of this Comment. This Comment advocates the conservative applica-
tion of both cy pres and administrative deviation based on impossibility
(impracticability), but not impracticality. See infra Part V.B.
See Cy Pres and Deviation, supra note 16, at 399 (noting that there are times
when an issue cannot be clearly categorized as falling under either cy pres or adminis-
trative deviation).
121 258 N.E.2d 745 (Mass. 1970).
122 See id. at 750-53.
1 See FISCH ET AL., supra note 3, § 549, at 410-11 (noting that courts are often
careless in their use of one doctrine instead of the other and that some courts label
alterations administrative in nature to avoid the requirements of cypres).
1997]
686 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 145: 665
Not surprisingly, this sort of manipulation goes to the very center-
piece of this Comment-the Barnes case.
The Barnes case was decided under the auspices of administrative
deviation. 1 4 The court found that the central purpose of the Founda-
tion is the "advancement of education and appreciation of fine arts,
and preservation of the collection therefor."'5 The court held that
the terms of the Foundation's Indenture prohibiting the lending and
removal of paintings from the Foundation were merely administra-
tive. Thus, deviations from these terms were acceptable and necessary
to protect the actual purpose of the trust.'
2 6
While the central purposes of the Foundation are education and
art appreciation, the deviations permitted by the Orphans' Court.- - • 127
cannot be summarily dismissed as administrative. The world exhi-
bition of the collection violated the express terms of the Indenture,
which were clearly of major importance to Dr. Barnes, as evidenced
by his explicit prohibition against any amendments to the central ar-
ticles of the Indenture.
2 8
The deviations undertaken by the Barnes trustees subsequent to
the world tour have effectively transformed the Foundation into a
museum,1 29 such that even if the deviations were properly considered
administrative, the result has been to alter the central purposes of the
Foundation. 30 The results of this case are outside the powers of both
cy pres and administrative deviation.
Cy pres and administrative deviation are necessary and construc-
tive tools when used moderately. 3 ' The underlying principle guiding
124 See supra text accompanying notes 65-66.
125 In re Barnes Found., No. 58,788, slip op. at 3 (C.P. Ct. Montgomery County, Pa.,
Orphans' Ct. Div.July 21, 1992).
126 See id. at 16-17.
127' See supra Part I.G.
128 See id.
12 See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
130 See id. Recall that Dr. Barnes provided for the dissolution of his Foundation
and the distribution of the collection in the event that his educational experiment was
a failure. The trustees' actions transforming the Foundation into a museum evidence
their belief that the educational experiment was a failure. If the trustees are right in
determining that the Foundation failed in its initial purpose, they are under obliga-
tion to follow Barnes's wishes and dissolve the Foundation. If the trustees are mis-
taken and the Foundation's educational purpose is still viable, they are wrong in mak-
ing that purpose subservient to the Foundation's current usage-a tourist attraction.
For example, the Barnes Indenture's investment guidelines were properly
modified under administrative deviation. This change undoubtedly does not attack
any of the purposes of the Foundation. Moreover, this change was necessary for the
endowment to keep pace with inflation and to provide the funding needed to main-
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both concepts is the desire to best effectuate the intent of the trustor.
Nevertheless, in the Barnes case and in many other instances, 2 trus-
tees deviate from donors' intentions-a practice not permitted under
either doctrine because it distorts the entire purpose underlying
charitable trusts.
D. The Role of Trustees
This Comment can be reduced to a simple discussion of the
proper role of trustees. Trustees are endowed with specific powers
and obligations granted and/or mandated by the document govern-
ing the trust, statutes and the common law. 3 For example, the trus-
tee of a charitable foundation has the power to grant leases in the
charity's property, 4 to mortgage the property, 3 5 and to contract and
incur expenses necessary to achieve the objectives of the founda-
tion. "' The duties of a charitable foundation's trustee include the
duty to "administer the charity fully and faithfully" in furtherance of
its purpose 's3 and the duty to "protect the interests of the beneficiaries
of the trust."'3
The duties and powers described above help illustrate the general
principles guiding trusteeship. A trustee is appointed and charged
with administering a trust for the benefit of another (the beneficiary).
The trustee has an obligation to serve the beneficiary.'39 The trustee
tain the collection.
The use of cy pres is proper when a factual basis clearly presents evidence of a do-
nor's general charitable intent and when the specifics of an indenture become impos-
sible or illegal to perform. For a prime example of such an instance, see the discus-
sion of In reEstate of Tomlinson, 359 N.E.2d 109 (Ill. 1976), supra note 15. The use of
impracticality as grounds for cy pres, however, is too easily manipulated. See In re Estate
of Buck, No. 23259 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1986), reprinted in 21 U.S.F. L. REV. 691, 749-53
(1987) (refusing to modify a trust on the basis of "efficiency" and defining
"impracticability" strictly); City of Danville v. Caldwell, 311 S.W.2d 561, 563 (Ky. 1958)
(noting that "cy pres... is not applied unless the particular... purpose is incapable of
performance").
132 See infra Part III.
133 See FISCH ET AL., supra note 3, §§ 457, 511, at 361-64, 389-90 (describing the
powers of a charity and the duties of a trustee).
'34 See id. § 459, at 366.
133 See id. § 460, at 367 (explaining that managers have the power to mortgage
charitable property if such authority is granted expressly or impliedly in the governing
instrument or by statute).
3 See id § 461, at 368.
137 Id. § 513, at 391.
138 Id. § 521, at 403.
139 See BLACK'S LAW DICnONARY, supra note 3, at 1514.
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of a charitable foundation, however, must do more than administer
the trust in the way she believes will be most advantageous to the
beneficiaries. She also has a duty to follow the intentions and di-
rections of the creator of the foundation in serving the best interests
of the beneficiaries.1 40 Obviously, a trustee should be afforded a fair
amount of discretion. The role of the trustee often calls forjudgment
in the face of ambiguity or uncertainty.' 4' Discretion and deviation,
however, are not synonymous. A trustee's discretion to deviate from
the express language of a trust document should be guided by the de-
sire to maintain the underlying purpose of the trust.' The New
Hampshire Supreme Court explained this scenario as follows:
"The court will direct or permit the trustee to deviate from a term of the
trust if owing to circumstances not known to the settlor and not antici-
pated by him compliance would defeat or substantially impair the accomplish-
ment of the purposes of the trust;, and in such case, if necessary to carry out the
purposes of the trust, the court may direct or permit the trustee to do acts
which are not authorized or are forbidden by the terms of the trust."
4
3
Once again, the relevant issues are the purpose of the trust and
necessity. An understanding of the proper role of the trustee in a
charitable foundation, along with the other principles discussed in
this Part, strengthens the position of this Comment as to the Barnes
controversy and similar situations.
140 See H. Thomas James, Perspectives on Internal Functioning of Foundations, in THE
FUTURE OF FOUNDATIONS 192, 193 (Fritz F. Heimann ed., 1973). James stated that
"trustees of endowed wealth are legally and morally responsible for the honest, pru-
dent management of the monies under their control. The most basic principle guid-
ing their duties is loyalty, both to the preservation and to the purposes of the trust."
Id.
141 SeeHarris v. Attorney Gen., 324 A.2d 279, 283 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1974).
"Where discretion is conferred upon the trustees of a charitable trust, the
court will not interfere with the exercise of their discretion, except to prevent
an abuse of discretion.... If the trustees act within the bounds of [a] reason-
able judgment in the exercise of the discretion conferred upon them, the
court will not interfere."
Id. at 283 (omission in original) (quoting IV AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT, THE LAW OF
TRUSTS § 382 (3d ed. 1967)); see also FIScH ET AL., supra note 3, § 476, at 384-86
(discussing the discretionary powers of trustees).
142 See FISCH ET AL., supra note 3, § 476, at 385 (noting that "the discretionary pow-
ers of the... [trustee] must be exercised in such a manner as to further the charitable
purposes of the entity" and that "courts will interfere with the discretion of those man-
aging a charity [when there] 'is... substantial departure ... from the dominant pur-
pose of the charity.'" (quoting Taylor v. Baldwin, 247 S.W.2d 741,750 (Mo. 1952))).
14 Jacobs v. Bean, 108 A.2d 559, 561 (N.H. 1954) (emphasis added) (quoting
RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 167(1) (1935)).
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III. DEVIATING FROM DONORS' WISHES: A COMMON OCCURRENCE
The Barnes Foundation is not the only case where the trustees of
charitable trusts have inappropriately44 deviated from the intentions
of the donors who created them. Noted author Martin Wooster de-
voted an entire book to exposing trustees' disregard for the wishes of
some of this nation's greatest philanthropists. 4 5 This Part provides a
brief examination of a few of these instances. They are a comparative
tool for the study of the Barnes case and donor intent in general.
A. The Ford Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation
The Ford Foundation is the largest charitable foundation in the
United States. 46 Wooster notes that Ford donated over one-third of
his income to charity, making him far more generous than his entre-
preneurial peers or the average American at the time.147 Ford, how-
ever, developed a strict philosophy for giving. His belief in self-
reliance was reflected in his motto for giving, "a chance and not
charity.' 4' Ford's belief in self-help, coupled with his disdain for gov-
ernment and its welfare projects, guided his charitable ambitions.
His idea of charity was to give people jobs and a chance to be produc-
tive. 49 Nevertheless, Ford left no instructions on how the Founda-
tion's funds should be administered following his death.50 Ford's
carelessness has given the Foundation the opportunity to fund pro-
grams that Ford would have diametrically opposed.'s' Today, the
Foundation repeatedly funds government studies and liberal causes.'5
144 The deviations undertaken by the Barnes trustees were sanctioned by a court
order and, thus, were not inappropriate in the sense of being unlawful. This
Comment argues, however, that the court and trustees acted improperly because they
did not adequately consider the intentions of Dr. Barnes.
14 SeeWOOSTER, supra note 26.
1 See Salisbury, supra note 8, at A26 (charting the size of the ten largest founda-
tions (citing the Foundation Center)). As of 1994, the Ford Foundation had $6.6 bil-
lion in assets-almost $600 million more than the next largest foundation-the
Kellog Foundation. See id.
148 See WOOSTER, supra note 26, at 14.
Id. at 18.
149 See id. at 15-18 (noting that Ford believed in supporting projects that allowed
the needy to be productive members of society).
1'0 SeeWALDEMARA. NIELSEN, THE GOLDEN DONORS 17 (1985).
151 See McMenamin, supra note 13, at 172.
152 See id. (noting that the Foundation's "pet project: the Center for Community
Change [is] a Washington D.C. outfit that promotes big government and higher
taxes").
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Like Henry Ford, Andrew Carnegie deplored the concept of pa-
ternalistic government."' He believed in aiding those who wanted to
help themselves and those who could not help themselves. 14 Also
like Ford, Carnegie created his charitable corporation (the equivalent
of a foundation) without giving it much instruction. He did, how-
ever, instruct the trustees to "best conform to [his] wishes by using
their own judgment" 5 when determining the Corporation's future
funding policies. After Carnegie's death, the Corporation slowly
drifted away from his principles of charity and instead increased fund-
ing for governmental welfare programs."'
B. The Buck Trust
Beryl Buck inherited her wealth from her husband's position in
the family oil business. She donated approximately $10 million in
stock to care for the impoverished of Main County, California,
5 7
where she spent the last thirty-seven years of her life.'58 The Marin
Community foundation's holdings grew tremendously in the ten
years following Buck's death in 1975 and are presently worth over
$400 million.' 9 The trustees of the foundation, seeing the enormous
increase in the size of the Trust, decided to expand the foundation's
charitable activities beyond Main County, which had become a rela-
tively wealthy region. '' They argued that Mrs. Buck never anticipated
the tremendous growth of the Trust and that limiting the Trust's ex-
penditures to Marin County would be wasteful. In the ensuing court
battle, the trustees lost. The court held that efficiency gains could not
be considered 6' and that no grounds for implementing cy pres existed,
153 See id.
154 See WOOSTER, supra note 26, at 29.
155 Id. at 31.
1 See NIELSEN, supra note 150, at 134 (stating that the Carnegie Corp. has become
the quintessential liberal, activist, entrepreneurial foundation); McMenamin, supra
note 13, at 172 (noting that the Foundation mainly funds social engineering programs
such as the Children's Defense Fund, which promotes expansion of government serv-
ices).
17 SeeMcMenamin, supra note 13, at 174.
158 See WOOSTER, supra note 26, at 53.
159 See DUKEMINIER &JOHANSON, supra note 8, at 617.
160 See WOOSTER, supra note 26, at 53 (noting that when Mrs. Buck settled there,
Marin County was mostly farmland, but when she died, it was one of America's
wealthiest counties); Laird, supra note 103, at 981 (noting that the trustees sought
permission to spend the Trust throughout the San Francisco Bay Area).
Recall from Part II.B that the doctrine of cy pres may be applicable where a par-
ticular charitable purpose becomes impossible or illegal to carry forward. The Buck
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thus preserving the donor's intent.""
C. ComparingFord, Carnegie, and Buck to Barnes
The cases documented in this Comment are not the only inci-
dents of trustee disregard for donors' intentions. ' s Rather, these
cases are included to highlight the many differing circumstances un-
der which donors' intentions are disregarded by the trustees who ad-
minister their foundations. Each instance of donor intent presents its
own issues and problems. The best way to illustrate this fact is to
compare the Barnes Foundation with the other foundations this
Comment reviews. The problems with Ford and Carnegie are distin-
guishable from the problems of Barnes and Buck in that the donors
in the former cases did not leave detailed instructions as to the uses of
their foundations' funds. In this sense, Henry Ford and Andrew
Carnegie contributed to the trustees' disregard of their intentions by
naively assuming that their foundations would follow their personal
philosophies for giving. Because Ford and Carnegie neglected to
leave detailed instructions, the deviations from their donative intent
are not products of the application of cy pres or administrative devia-
tion or any judicial determination. Unlike the Barnes and Buck trus-
tees, the Ford and Carnegie trustees are able to deviate without per-
mission or interference from the courts. These latter trustees need
no legal justification to pursue their own interests at the expense of
the donors' wishes.
Barnes is distinct from Buck because Buck dealt with a question of
cy pres--altering the very functioning of the trust-whereas the Barnes
decision was couched in terms of administrative deviation. All of the
aforementioned cases can be further distinguished from the Barnes
case with the argument that the Barnes deviation grew out of eco-
nomic need; in the other cases, the deviations were solely a product
court properly noted that the inefficiency of trust expenditures does not fall within
these defined limits for the application of cy pres. The court recognized the ambiguity
of inefficiency as grounds for trust modification. Moreover, the court noted that im-
practicability is actually equated with impossibility for cy pres consideration. See In re
Estate of Buck, No. 23259 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1986), reprinted in 21 U.S.F. L. REv. 691, 746-
55 (1987).
162 See id. at 759-61 (concluding that Marin County still has needs that go unful-
filled, even with the Trust's funding, such that the purpose of the Trust is still viable).
10 See generally WOOSTER, supra note 26, at 14-60 (discussing many other instances
where donor intent is routinely violated).
364 The Barnes Foundation was in an obvious state of disrepair with little financial
support prior to its world exhibition. Critics of the tour and of the subsequent devia-
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of differing philanthropic philosophies, "5 making them more obvious
instances of disregard for the wishes of the donors.
Nevertheless, this discussion of Ford, Carnegie and Buck is in-
cluded because these cases demonstrate an underlying similarity with
the Barnes case-wayward trusteeship. Despite their factual differ-
ences, the ultimate sources of neglected donor intent in each in-
stance are trustees that do not uphold the ideals of the people who
established the foundations.
IV. THE VALUE OF UPHOLDING DONOR INTENT
The preceding three Parts of this Comment are anchored in the
underlying assumption that donors' wishes should be routinely de-
ferred to unless extraordinary circumstances arise. As such, this
Comment has argued against a liberal application of cy pres or admin-
istrative deviation to alter the course of a philanthropic foundation. ' '
More expansively, this Comment has questioned the propriety of de-
viations from donor intent that are accomplished without resort to
any doctrinal justification.'r 7
Because donative intent and the related issue of dead hand con-
trol are among the most controversial and often-debated topics in
trusts and estates law, competing perspectives and assertions should
be properly acknowledged. Assuming the primary objective guiding
the law of charitable foundations is their positive impact on society,
all sides of the issue must be considered to determine the best course
for the law to follow. Unless the benefits that accrue from a commit-
ment to donative intent outweigh the gains that can be achieved from
liberal deviation, there is little reason to safeguard the wishes of phi-
lanthropists.
The most basic argument for respecting donor intent is that trus-
tions undertaken by the trustees have argued, however, that the economic need justi-
fication was merely a convenient vehicle used by the Barnes trustees to implement
their own agenda for the Foundation. See supra Part I.B-C (noting the claim that the
trustees never attempted to raise the needed funding by means that would not violate
Dr. Barnes's intentions).
1 The Ford, Carnegie and Buck donor-intent issues did not involve economic
need. In fact, the Buck dilemma supposedly came about because the Trust had too
much money for its intended purpose.
166 See supra note 131 and accompanying text. See generally supra Part II.D
(discussing general principles of trusteeship).
167 See supra Part III.A & C. Because Ford and Carnegie did not expressly mandate
adherence to their charitable intentions, the trustees of these foundations freely devi-
ated from the charitable philosophies of the trustors without legal impediment.
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tees have a moral and legal responsibility to respect the wishes of trus-
tors.'ta  This argument may emanate from the American ideology
valuing capitalism and the right to property. A donor's right to have
her intentions respected by her trustees, one may assert, is an exten-
sion of a donor's rights in the property donated. The donor accumu-
lated the wealth, thus the donor has earned the right to voice her ex-
pectations and to direct the charitable disposition of that property.
Although compelling, this simplistic argument cannot be the only
basis on which the protection of the intent of donors relies. Just as
the trustees of a foundation have a responsibility to the trustor, they
also have a moral and legal obligation to the beneficiaries of the
trust"' J And in certain circumstances, trustees may argue that their
obligations to their beneficiaries demand that they deviate from the
wishes of the donor.'70 The strongest justifications for either valuing
or dismissing donative intent lie beyond the morality and legality of
the issue. The superior policy is the one that maximizes the benefits
society receives from charitable donations.
This Comment previously highlighted the salient features of
charitable foundations: (1) their potentially limitless duration-they
are exempt from the Rule Against Perpetuities; and (2) their tax ex-
empt status-the exemption of income generated by foundations and
the tax deductions given to their donors.' These features create so-
cial costs. By providing these exemptions, society effectively subsi-
dizes the perpetual activities of foundations regardless of the benefits
to society.7
According to one opponent of dead hand control, because society
1W See WOOSTER, supra note 26, at 124 (suggesting that foundation officers should
respect the dead and give grants that are consistent with their founders' views); Atkin-
son, supra note 23, at 1121 (identifying the argument that disregarding donors' intent
is inherently wrong).
1G9 See supra Part II.D (discussing the proper role of trustees).
170 For example, a trust could be established with instructions from the donor to
"provide housing to the needy." At some future time, the trustees may argue that al-
though the needy could still use housing, they have a greater, more imminent need
for food. Morally then, is it not better for the trustees to deviate from the intent of the
donor and use the trust funds to purchase food for the needy?
Please note that this Comment often discusses trustees' deviations. Implicit in
these discussions is that trustees have court approval when required. This Comment
does not intend to imply that trustees who deviate from donors' wishes do so unlaw-
fully, circumventing the properjudicial procedures.
171 See supra Part ILA
I SeeWATERBURY, supra note 98, at 1017-18 (detailing the charitable trust exemp-
tion from the Rule Against Perpetuities and the favorable tax treatment given to such
trusts).
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"pays" for the benefits that charitable foundations provide, the bal-
ance between donor intent/property rights and the common good
should lean in favor of the common good. '7 Extending this argu-
ment, opponents of dead hand control assert that donor control over
charitable donations should be limited to the same extent that con-
trol over private gifts is curtailed.'
74
This Comment does not quarrel with the proposition that chari-
table foundations should be governed by those principles that at-
tempt to extract the maximum societal benefits. The claim that ad-
herence to donor intent and the common good are inversely related
or even mutually exclusive, however, is a fallacy. In isolated instances,
abiding by donors' wishes may seem to diminish the potential benefit
that a foundation provides. Nonetheless, as the following discussion
will illustrate, in most cases the protection of donor intent actually
maximizes the public welfare that foundations can provide.
A. Efficient Philanthrpy
1. Donor Knows Best
A popular notion among academic commentators is that strict
adherence to donor intent leads to the inefficient use of funds by
charitable foundations. 75 Their basic argument is that charitable
trust law allows a donor to specify how her foundation's funds will be
administered throughout the life of the foundation,' 76 and since a
foundation can be perpetual in duration, 77 a charitable trust is often
controlled by the "dead hand."'78 Dead hand control, it is argued, is
inefficient and even wasteful because donors rarely account for the
changing needs and values of society.F' These commentators pro-
pose a more liberal approach to charitable trust administration.1
8
0
17S See Chester, supra note 110, at 424.
174 See, e.g., id.
175 SeeRICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 482-83 (3d ed. 1986).
176 See supra text accompanying note 97.
177 See supra text accompanying note 94.
178 SeeSisson, supra note 94, at 635.
19 See id.
180 See id. at 651-53 (arguing that statutory interpretation of cy pres should be ex-
panded to modify the purposes of a trust when they become inefficient); see also Ches-
ter, supra note 110, at 425 (arguing for broader application of the cy pres doctrine and
less attention to individual intent of donors); DiClerico, supra note 110, at 195
(arguing for statutory and equitable expansion of the cy pres doctrine); Johnson & Tay-
lor, supra note 110, at 547 (arguing that courts should take an expansive approach to
PROTECTING 'DONOR INTENT"
They assert that charitable trusts should be flexible so as to
maximize the benefit to the public. Relying on this rationale, several
legislatures have enacted more liberal versions of cy pres and many
courts have construed the cy pres doctrine more expansively, in an at-
tempt to further their view of the public interest. s'
This efficiency argument is compelling on its face, but when ex-
amined for practicality and consequence, it is flawed. To recognize
the problems with the efficiency approach it is necessary to ask several
questions: What is an efficient use of resources? How can society and
the law best maximize a foundation's benefit to the public? Who
should determine society's best interests? Are those who propose an
efficiency standard prepared to carry their argument to its conclu-
sion?
An efficient use of resources is that which has the greatest value to
society or that which maximizes the benefit to the public." Thus, the
test for efficiency is inherently subjective, and determining the best
interest of the commonwealth depends on each person's concerns
and values. Recognizing that each person's perception of society's
needs and problems is subjective leads to the conclusion that "the
maximum benefit to society" is equally as subjective./ There is no
"correct" answer to the question of what is the efficient use of funds.
Whoever controls the distribution of a foundation's funds will make
an individualistic determination of what the best interests of society
are.
If society embraced a slightly altered view of charitable effi-
ciency-the concept of relative need-trustees would follow a policy
of directing charitable funding to those people or causes with the
greatest need. 8 Even putting aside the recurring problem of subjec-
tivity and assuming that there is an objective hierarchy of needs, al-
lowing trustees to allocate trust funds based on that hierarchy of
needs would lead to a conclusion that is unrealistic and even destruc-
tive: "[A]ll charitable gifts, and the fundamental basis of philan-
cy pres by balancing the interests of the settlor, unintended beneficiaries and commu-
nity in the efficacious use of the trust assets).
181 See FISCH ET AL., supra note 3, § 589, at 467 (noting that some states, including
Pennsylvania, have eliminated the general charitable intent requirement and that
some courts avoid the use of cy pres altogether in order to give trustees greater discre-
tion).
182 See In reEstate of Buck, No. 23259 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1986), repyinted in 21 U.S.F. L.
REV. 691, 751-52 n.6 (1987).
183 See id
184 See id.
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thropy would be threatened, as there may always be more compelling
'needs' to fill than the gift chosen by the testator."' '
For example, a foundation specifically established to serve the
poor of Philadelphia might fail or be challenged on the grounds that
there are poorer people with greater needs in the Appalachian region
of Kentucky. A foundation that funds AIDS research might be chal-
lenged on the grounds that cancer research is more valuable. One
might argue that the Barnes Foundation might serve the public need
better (and be more efficient) if it were run as an art museum rather
than as an educational institute. Courts would then be required to
consider social utility and to "substitute their judgments or those of
the trustees for those of the donors.""' The litigation concerning
such issues would be endless, and the administrative costs of these re-
allocations would be enormous. Consequently, the time and money
wasted determining how money would be best spent (assuming that
issue is ever really determinable) would most likely negate the
reallocative gains desired.
Since philanthropists establish foundations and provide for their
funding, does it not follow that we should adhere to their ideas of soci-
ety's best interest? Moreover, adherence to donors' intentions is the
best way to minimize administrative and legal costs and to maximize
the funds actually distributed to the beneficiaries.
87
This Comment does not advocate blind adherence to the objec-
tives of the donor. If a donor's intentions for a foundation or her
administrative guidelines become impossible, impracticable or illegal,
then the law allows trustees to exercise prudent discretion '  while al-
ways considering the donor's philosophy.'9  The position of this
Comment is simply that deference toward and respect for donors' in-
tent should remain a guiding principle in the administration of chari-
table foundations.
183 Id.
186 Id.
187Allowing trustees greater discretion over trust administration will lead to an
increase in conflicts like the Barnes case. In resolving these conflicts, foundations
waste valuable resources on legal expenses. Similarly, granting trustees greater power
over trusts leads to increased administrative time and expense.
18 See supra Part II.D (discussing the proper role of trustees); see also In re Estate of
Buck, No. 23259 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1986), reprinted in 21 U.S.F. L. REV. 691, 751-52
(1987) (noting that inefficiency does not constitute impracticability under the cy pres
doctrine and that something becomes impracticable only if it would fail to accomplish
the general charitable intention of the donor).
,, See supra Part II.D.
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2. The "Rational Donor" Theory
Building on the questionable theme of efficiency maximization
raised by opponents of dead hand control, Richard Posner asserts
that "rigid adherence to the letter of donative intent is likely to frus-
trate a donor's purpose. ' " Posner contends that a rational and rea-
sonable donor would not intend for her gift to perpetuate if the pur-
poses of that gift become useless or inefficient. A rational donor
would actually prefer modification of her gift when it is no longer ef-
ficient.'9' Posner posits that a rational donor knows that her inten-
tions may be thwarted by unpredictable circumstances and may be
presumed to implicitly accept deviations. 1
2
Jonathan Macey countered Posner's claims on a number of
fronts. 93 Macey noted that overregulation and liberal modifications
of settlors' rights to dispose of their wealth may be inefficient because
such policies interfere with one incentive for wealth accumulation-
the ability to influence society after death by directing the disposition
of property.1 94 In the context of discussing the application of cy pres to
charitable trusts, Macey claimed that when "significant aspect[s] of a
settlor's intentions are thwarted"'95 by unforeseen circumstances, the
most efficient solution is not modification but reversion of the gift
back to the settlor's heirs.'9 6 Macey questioned Posner's premise that
setflors cannot prepare or plan for the unexpected.' 97 Macey claimed
that donors may be able to leave charitable gifts that provide exten-
sive contingency plans and the like in the event of changed condi-
tions. Donors may not specify, however, all possible contingencies
because the related transactions and error costs may render such
planning inefficient. 98 In other words, donors may not implicitly
condone deviations from their charitable donations to avoid ineffi-
ciency or uselessness. Instead, donors may recognize the costs of
planning for the unforeseen and decide that the most efficient way to
deal with that situation is reversion of the gift.
190 POSNER, supra note 175, at 482.
191 See id. at 482-83.
1'- See id.
193 See Jonathan R. Macey, Private Trusts for the Provision of Private Goods, 37 EMORY
LJ. 295 (1988).
194 See id. at 297.
195 Id. at 306.
'96 See id.
197 See id. at 298.
19s See id. at 297-98.
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Macey's underlying premise is that the "goals of the legal system
should be to establish rules that reduce the incidence of transaction
costs, error costs, and agency costs associated with the creation of a
trust." '9 A legal system that permits liberal application of ty pres or
administrative deviation increases the costs of establishing founda-
tions to donors who want to safeguard their charitable foundations.2 00
Furthermore, as noted in the previous section, deviation leads to liti-
gation costs, and administrative and reallocative expenses.
As Macey demonstrates, efficiency is actually better served by re-
version than by modification. As a result, courts should attempt to ef-
fectuate donor intent and minimize the costs associated with devia-
tions. When donative intent can no longer be followed, cy pres and
deviation should be applied conservatively, recognizing that reversion
is often the most efficient alternative.
B. Respect for Donor Intent: A Necessary Incentive
Society limits the dead hand control of trustors when their dispo-
201sitions are private in nature. When people create charitable trusts,
however, the law permits extended dead hand control.2  This excep-
tion can best be described as a bargain: as an incentive for people to
donate their wealth for the public welfare, the law permits them to
specify the use of that gift perpetually.2
°1
Without extensive donor control over foundation administration,
the use of foundations as a vehicle for philanthropic activities is likely
to diminish greatly.2 4 Some opponents of donor intent may claim
that with or without the use of foundations, the wealthy will still give
1 Id. at 320.
200 See id. at 302.
201 See generally UNIF. STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, in SELECTED
STATUTES ON TRUSTS AND ESTATES 490-552 (John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Wag-
goner eds., 1987); supra note 93 (defining the Rule Against Perpetuities).
22 SeeAtkinson, supra note 23, at 1114 (stating that, with respect to charitable gifts,
the "state not only allows perpetual dead hand control, but also monitors and enforces
it").
203 See id.
204 See FISCH ET AL., supra note 3, § 42, at 42 (suggesting that foundations are used
as a means for the creator to commit her funds to a charitable use of special interest to
her); Odendahl, supra note 22, at 236 (noting that surveys show that control is a pri-
mary motivating factor for the creation of charitable trusts). If this primary motivation
for the establishment of foundations is taken away, foundations lose a major advan-
tage. Consequently, donors will look to other charitable vehicles for the benefits they
offer, or they will reduce their charity altogether.
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to charity and therefore the "inefficient" bargain 05 should no longer
be a part of charitable trust law.
Two questions arise from this claim: (1) Would the wealthy give as
much to charity regardless of their use of foundations, knowing that
they could not "control" their charitable gifts forever?; and (2) As-
suming that potential donors would give to charity with the same level
of generosity regardless of the control they could maintain over their
gifts, are there distinctive benefits derived from foundations, such
that we should encourage their continued use?
1. Generosity Is Related to the Level of Control
Without control over their charity, some philanthropists would
decrease their level of giving.2°r Knowing that their fortunes may be
207put to uses of which they disapprove or even despise, some donors
may forego public charity altogether, choosing instead to squander
their money during their lifetimes or to bequeath it to friends and
family. Therefore, to encourage people to keep giving funds that
benefit the public, the law must respect and uphold the wishes of do-
nors even when those wishes are unpopular or seem unwise.
Jonathan Macey provides insight that further illuminates the like-
lihood that charity is related to the level of control. Modifications are
often permitted on the assertion that they are minor or that they do
not affect the "dominant purpose of the gift" 28 Courts and trustees
may argue that such modifications are necessary to carry out the
broader purposes of the trust and intentions of the donor. This ar-
205 By "inefficient" bargain, this Comment is referring to the extension of dead
hand control as an inducement for charitable generosity in the form of public trusts.
206 See Atkinson, supra note 23, at 1121 (stating that "once donors know their in-
tentions can be disregarded without legal penalty, they will be less inclined to give");
Osborne, supra note 13, atA25 ("'If a will isn't sacrosanct under the law, what is? The
Fricks, Barneses and Carnegies of the future are going to think very carefully before
donating... to our future generations.'" (quoting Thomas Freudenheim, the Smith-
sonian Institute's Under Secretary for Museums)). Recall also that charitable founda-
tions provide over $6 billion annually to nonprofit organizations. See supra note 8
(noting the large number of foundations with distributions totalling in the billions of
dollars). If the overall level of generosity of America's wealthy diminished by even a
few percentage points, the decrease in charitable donations would be enormous in
dollar amounts.
-07 See supra Part III.A.
00 Macey, supra note 193, at 304. See generally In re Barnes Found., No. 58,788, slip
op. at 16 (C.P. Ct. Montgomery County, Pa., Orphans' Ct. Div. July 21, 1992) (noting
that the Court may permit administrative deviations to protect the "accomplishment of
the purpose of the Trust").
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gument ignores the fact that grantors usually have a range of options
as to how to dispose of their property."" The utility that a donor re-
ceives from a charitable donation of her property may be only mar-
ginally higher than the donor's utility from a private disposition of
her property. When donors believe that their intentions can be easily
thwarted through supposedly minor or inconsequential deviations,
the marginally higher utility they receive from the charitable disposi-
tions may vanish. Consequently, some donors may dispose of their
property privately.
Macey's argument is applicable to the Barnes Foundation. If Al-
bert Barnes knew that his Foundation would become an art museum
and that many of his demands for the administration and disposition
of the collection would be ignored or modified, would he have even
created the Foundation or donated his art to charity in the first place?
Recognizing the possibility that their intentions will be trampled
upon, how many future philanthropists will decide to forego charita-
ble donations?
2. The Distinct Benefits of the Foundation
W.J. Hume made an interesting observation regarding donor in-
tent. He said that "[a] major inflow of funds into philanthropic insti-
tutions will occur within the next two decades. Those who made their
money after World War II will reach maturity, and their estates will be
passed to their heirs and to foundations. 2' 0 Assuming Hume is cor-
rect, the issue of donor intent is as important now as ever. How this
impending wealth distribution is allocated between private and public
donations cannot be foreseen with any certainty. Similarly uncertain
is whether those settlors committed to the public welfare will use the
foundation or some alternative charitable mechanism as their mode
of giving. One thing is certain-disregard for donor intent dimin-
ishes the attractiveness of the charitable trust to potential donors.
Therefore, society must determine whether charitable trusts are worth
promoting and preserving.
Assuming arguendo that the wealthy would be equally generous
in their charity regardless of their use of foundations, are there still
valid reasons for promoting the creation of foundations? Do founda-
tions provide benefits not present in other means of charity? The an-
209 See Macey, supra note 193, at 303-04 (discussing the case of Evans v. Abney, 396
U.S. 435 (1970)).
210 W.J. Hume, Preface to WOOSTER, supra note 26, at vii.
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swer to both of these questions is a definitive "yes." The following are
examples of the valuable attributes of foundations.
a. The Transfer Function
One commentator notes that the primary function of foundations
is to act as a transfer mechanism.21' Foundations take in money from
the upper class and distribute those funds to reputable nonprofit or-
ganizations. The claim is that foundational support has been vital to
212the stability and well-being of these organizations. Skeptics might
contend that the wealthy would support charitable organizations re-
gardless of their use of foundations, and that foundations are merely
middlemen creating increased administrative costs.2 s Nonetheless,
supporters of foundations note that "it is not easy for a person of
great wealth to personally dispose of large amounts of money intelli-
gently and wisely. Efficient generosity requires an organization and
expert assistance."
21 4
Through a foundation, a donor effectively hires professional
managers-trustees-who are asked to recognize the donor's wishes
and to ensure that her wealth is distributed according to those wishes
in perpetuity. The trustees serve as the donor's eyes and ears long af-
ter she has passed. The donor sees the foundation as a viable mecha-
nism for transferring her funds according to her philosophy, regard-
less of whether that donor is personally able to oversee her charity.
The foundation works as a transfer device because it fosters donor
trust.
b. Voluntarism and Capitalism
Foundations preserve two traditions Americans cherish: volunta-
rism and capitalism. 2' 5 They allow people to contribute to the public
welfare independent of government mandates such as taxation. Ad-
211 See WALDEMAR A. NIELSEN, THE BIG FOUNDATIONS 400-05 (1972) (noting that
foundations provide measurable financial sustenance to charitable organizations that
ensures the stability of the system).
212 See id. at 400 ("Foundations are thus an integral part of the present American
institutional establishment. By their contributions they help primarily to ensure the
stability and continuity of the system.").
213 See id. at 403-05 (questioning the need for foundations in light of their costs,
which include administrative expenses and damage to public confidence in the na-
tional tax system because of special tax privileges to the very rich).
214 FiScH ET AL, supra note 3, § 42, at 42.
215 See NIELSEN, supra note 211, at 401.
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ditionally, the value of charitable trusts is heavily influenced by the
belief in the free market and self-determination. The American
creed stands for the view that people are allowed to accumulate vast
quantities of wealth and dispose of it in the way they see fit (as long as
neither is done illegally or tortiously) .216
c. The Foundation as a Creative and Expressive Tool
Because the foundation is easy to create and operate, it allows in-
dividuals to maintain their own charitable projects. In this sense, a
foundation is a tool for creativity in giving. It allows a person to
commit funds to programs that express that individual's personalized
set of values. 217 Therefore, the foundational system can fund projects
that might not find governmental or mainstream societal support.28
Foundations can perpetuate the visions and philosophies of their
donors. Because the donors of charitable trusts tend to be successful
321people, the preservation of their creativity and foresight is logically
a valuable resource for future generations. A foundation can pre-
serve the unique ideology of the donor that proved prudent and suc-
cessful during the life of that donor, and that also has the potential to
220produce successful results after the life of that donor.
The arguments set forth in this Part have demonstrated the value
of foundations. Recognizing the value of the foundation as a charita-
ble instrument substantiates the claim that donor intent is worth pro-
tecting. Therefore, the law should guard against neglect of donative
intent in charitable trusts in order to preserve the future of founda-
tions.
26 See id. (noting that private philanthropy sprang from the "interrelatedness of
private property, religious and ethical values, and democracy" (citing JOSEPH A.
SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (3d ed. 1950))).
217 See FISCH ET AL, supra note 3, § 42, at 42 n.57 ("'[T] he foundation has a special
potential for the development and expression of original ideas, for the harnessing of
individual creativity.'" (citation omitted)).
218For example, the Hewlett Foundation of California, a foundation with hun-
dreds of millions in assets, provides grants for research on population control and fer-
tility reduction. See NIELSEN, supra note 150, at 207, 211. The Barnes Foundation is
another example of unique charitable funding.
219 See Eugene Steuerle, Charitable Giving Patterns of the Wealthy, in AMERICA'S
WEALTHY, supra note 4, at 203, 215 (providing the findings of a study showing that the
wealthiest people are those most likely to start new charities or foundations).
220
As one man stated, "'If you have got enough sense to make the money, you
ought to have enough sense to give some direction as to what you are going to do with
it.'" Odendahl, supra note 22, at 230.
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V. SUGGESTIONS FOR DONORS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM TO AVOID THE
PROBLEMS OF IMPROPER DEVIATION AND WAYWARD TRUSTEESHIP
The goal in the preceding four Parts of this Comment was to set
forth the proposition that disregard for donor intent is a problem en-
countered by many charitable foundations such as the Barnes Foun-
dation, and to demonstrate that this problem needs to be addressed.
The objective in this Part is to propose practical steps philanthropists
and the legal system should take to inhibit the subordination of do-
nor intent.
A. Specificity and Priority
In Ford, Carnegie and other similar situations, the philanthro-
pists themselves must share in the responsibility for their foundations'
failure to follow donor intent. These donors are at fault for providing
very little instruction regarding the administration of their trusts.2'
Donors often provide little guidance to their successors, naively as-
suming that those who control their charitable gifts will honor their
philanthropic philosophies.2 Nevertheless, trustees accepting re-
sponsibility for the charity of another should follow in the traditions22'
of the person who created the charity, even if that requires the trus-
tees to investigate and uncover those traditions. The history of the
Ford Foundation and Carnegie Corporation proves that trustees are
occasionally unwilling to determine the intent of the trustor and
sometimes even choose to ignore it.
2 2 4
1. Defining Charitable Purpose and Intent
Donors of charitable trusts must be specific in developing the
guidelines that control the purpose, use and administration of their
foundations. If nothing else, the donor who wants her intentions
followed should spell out her charitable philosophy, providing exam-
ples of acceptable and unacceptable uses for her foundation. If a do-
nor has no preference regarding how her foundation should be ad-
-21 See supra text accompanying notes 150 & 155.
M See WOOSTER, supra note 26, at 124 (suggesting that donors should express their
intentions as specifically as possible rather than leaving their fortunes to professionals
whoffend the money on causes they prefer).
See NIELSEN, supra note 211, at 320 (noting that trustees customarily honor the
donors' notions about the priorities of the foundation).
-24 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 150-52 & 156.
"1-1 SeeWOOSTER, supra note 26, at 124.
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ministered, she should note her ambivalence in the trust instrument
in order to avoid future conflict. Moreover, donors should clarify
whether their charitable wishes are general in purpose or specific-
thus allowing for the proper application of the cy pres doctrine.
In the same manner, a donor who does not wish to manifest a
general charitable intent must detail what circumstances constitute a
failure of the specific purposes of her foundation. This donor should
also establish how her trustees are to distribute her property or funds
in the event of failure.
Unfortunately, the Barnes and Buck cases illustrate that specificity
of intention is not a complete solution to the problem of donor in-
tent. Although both donors were explicit, their trustees still at-
tempted to deviate from the donors' specifications. As this Comment
has documented, the Barnes trustees succeeded in their attempt,22
while the Buck trustees were thwarted in their attempt by a judge who
was conscientious of the donor's wishes. 7
2. Expecting the Unexpected
Donors must realize that their administrative schemes for giving
will encounter obstacles due to economic, legal and social evolu-
228don. The Barnes and Buck cases are paradigmatic examples of this
problem. Recognizing this possibility, donors should provide for ac-
ceptable alternatives in the administrations and/or purposes of their
foundations in the event of failure or dramatic change. 2 " A donor
cannot be expected to foresee all of the circumstances that may oc-
cur, but she can leave instructions for common events.
Albert Barnes made an effort to follow this recommendation230
(although not thoroughly). Nonetheless, his wishes were ignored by
his trustees.2 A donor should, therefore, explicitly prioritize the
226 See supra Part I.B-C.
227 See supra Part III.B.
228 See, e.g., In re Estate of Buck, No. 23259 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1986), reprinted in 21
U.S.F. L. REv. 691 (1987); In re Barnes Found., No. 58,788 (C.P. Ct. Montgomery
County, Pa., Orphans' Ct. Div.July 21, 1992).
See Sisson, supra note 94, at 646 (noting that the trustor should include in the
trust instrument instructions granting the trustee discretion in the event of certain
triggering events).
See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text (noting that Barnes specified that
there were to be no amendments to the conditions of the Indenture after his death,
and that in the case of failure, the trustees could disband the Foundation, giving away
the collection to suitable institutions).
221 See supra Part I.C (describing the wayward trusteeship of the Barnes Founda-
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guidelines of her trust. She should delineate which elements of her
trust are most important and central to the purpose and administra-
tion of the foundation. If deviations are inevitable, trustees and
courts will be better equipped to determine which deviations can be
accepted without destroying the purpose of the trust and which devia-
tions constitute a failure of the trust.
The suggestions mentioned thus far are self-help techniques that
permit donors to influence the continuing purposes of their founda-
tions. 2 This Comment's final recommendation is directed at the le-
gal system in its supervision of charitable-trust administration.
B. Modifying the Legal Standard for Cy Pres and Deviation
The Barnes case is a prime example of the legal system's failure to
uphold donor intent in the face of charitable-foundation trustees who
wish to deviate from that intent. Moreover, Parts I.C and II.C of this
Comment highlight the difficulty- in distinguishing between mere
administrative deviation and deviation from purpose-the application
of cy pres. As a result of these two problems, an additional legal hur-
dle should be erected to protect donor intent.
When courts are asked to rule on petitions of cy pres and/or devia-
tion, their initial inquiry should focus on the necessity of the devia-
tion. There should be a rebuttable presumption against permitting
any type of deviation from the intent of the donor, which can be
overcome only when the trustee makes a showing of indisputable
need.233 Before courts undertake either traditional cy pres4 or admin-
istrative deviation2s analyses, they should pose two threshold ques-
tions to the parties seeking to deviate from the wishes of donors:
(1) Have all reasonable efforts to comply with the terms of the Inden-
ture been exhausted?2 G and (2) Will the foundation fail in its purpose
tion).
232 For more suggestions, see WOOSTER, supra note 26, at 121-25 (advising, among
other things, that donors create foundations with term limits since the longer a foun-
dation exists, the greater the possibility that donor intent will be neglected).
233 Some courts have already required a showing of need. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Bean,
108 A.2d 559, 561 (N.H. 1954) ("deviation is allowed.., only to the extent necessary
to effectuate the primary purpose of the trust" (citing Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Morgan,
51 A.2d 841, 843 (N.H. 1947)).
234 See supra Part II.B.
23 See supra Part ILC.
Exhaustion of all reasonable efforts would require a showing by the trustees
that they pursued all avenues to remedy their foundation's problems that did not vio-
late the wishes of the donor, and that these attempts proved fruitless. Thus, the only
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if the desired deviation is not allowed?2
7
The second question is, admittedly, very similar to the cy pres re-
quirement that the particular purpose of the trust be impossible, im-
practicable or illegal,2 3 and is analogous to the deviation requirement
that compliance with a particular trust term be impossible or illegal. 20
Nevertheless, there are valid reasons for the inclusion of this thresh-
old question. First, as failure of purpose only relates to impossibility
or illegality, impracticality would not be sufficient grounds for moving
240beyond this threshold analysis. Second, this question is necessary to
curtail the abusive use of administrative deviation; that is, the use of
administrative deviation to achieve modifications that actually go to
charitable purpose and cy pres, such as that evidenced by the Barnes
recourse available to the foundation requires some deviation (cy pres or administra-
tive). Once the trustees satisfy their initial burden of demonstrating "exhaustion," the
burden would shift to the party opposed to the requested deviation, requiring them to
establish that nonviolative means are still available.
Because this test is fact specific, the best manner of demonstrating its application
is through an example. In the Barnes case, the trustees never pursued aid from other
charitable foundations or the government. Specifically, the trustees appeared to ig-
nore offers from the Getty Trust to assist in their dilemma. See supra note 64 and ac-
companying text. Therefore, the trustees would be unable to prove that the desired
deviations were necessary because they did not exhaust all reasonable efforts to com-
ply with the Indenture.
This second question examines what will happen to the foundation if the re-
quested deviation is not granted. A failure-of-purpose test would require a showing
that without the deviation, the foundation would simply not be able to operate in ac-
cordance with its specific or general intent. Therefore, there must be proof of impos-
sibility or illegality of purpose under current conditions to satisfy the requirements of
this test.
2M See supra Part II.B. This threshold question, however, mandates a showing that
the purpose of the trust will fail without deviation, whereas cy pres mandates a showing
that the specific purposes of the trust have already failed. Thus, as applied to cy pres
issues, the threshold question relates to the eventual failure of any determinable gen-
eral charitable purpose.
239 See supra Part II.C. Recall that administrative deviation requires a showing that
the specific terms of a trust can no longer be followed, whereas the threshold question
mandates a showing that the purpose of the trust will fail without deviation. This
threshold question, as it relates to administrative deviation, will increase the level of
scrutiny.
240 See supra note 131 (discussing the Buck court's rejection of impracticality as
proper grounds for the application of cy pres). Impracticality should not be grounds
for disregarding a donor's intent, because it is too ambiguous a standard. The use of
impracticality allows courts and trustees to deviate from donor intent when they be-
lieve such deviation is convenient or suitable to their ulterior motives, such as effi-
ciency. Because deviation should be reserved for cases of need, impracticality must be
discarded as a standard. By excluding impracticality as a basis for surviving this second
threshold question, only cases of impossibility or illegality will reach cy pres or adminis-
trative deviation analysis.
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case.2 1' Even when courts and trustees have the best interests of the
donor's intent in mind, they are faced with the difficulty of determin-
ing what is central to the donor's intent and what is administrative.242
Requiring the initially high standard that failure of purpose, or po-
tential failure, be a threshold element for either type of deviation re-
moves some of the concern as to how a deviation is characterized.
If, and only if, the trustees can show that the answer to both of
these threshold questions is "yes" should the court grant the trustees a
hearing on the merits of cy pres or administrative deviation. In under-
taking traditional cy pres or administrative deviation analyses, courts
should require that any deviations requested and permitted be as
243nondisruptive as possible to the terms of the indenture. This re-
quirement addresses the central concern of this Comment-protect-
ing donor intent.
Requiring that deviations be as minimal as possible would be con-
sistent with the idea of desperate need as the basis for any modifica-
tions. As a practical matter, the degree of disruptiveness will be read-
ily discernible if the donors follow the suggestions in Part V.A. That
is, if a donor is explicit in articulating her purposes for a trust and
prioritizing her concerns, her trustees and any courts hearing their
petitions will have a better understanding of which deviations would
be acceptable and which would be completely improper. If courts
used the inquiry proposed here and if donors took the suggested pre-
cautionary steps,244 donative intent would be easier to identify and
harder to disrupt.
C. Responding to Possible Counterarguments
1. Trust Failures
A foreseeable criticism of the threshold test proposed herein is
that it will cause more trusts to fail. By increasing the level of scrutiny
in the test that must be met before any deviations are allowed, many
241 See supra Part II.C (noting how the Barnes court used administrative deviation
to achieve improper modifications).
242 See supra Part I.C (noting the trustees' and court's inability to distinguish be-
tween Barnes's central purpose and issues of administrative management).
243 SeeJacobs v. Bean, 108 A.2d 559, 562 (N.H. 1954) (noting that the deviation
permitted by the court "is no more than is necessary to accomplish the primary objec-
tives of the testator").
244 See supra Part V.A
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more foundations will fail.245 While courts following this Comment's
suggestions in Part V.B, and the analysis of cy pres in Part II.B, may be
more willing to allow a trust to fail than to allow improper deviation
(as in cases in which there is no finding of general charitable intent
or a mere finding of impracticality of purpose), failure would not be-
come a more prevalent phenomenon if donors follow the suggestions
in Part V.A. If donors provide contingency plans and alternative uses
in the event that their specific intentions cannot be followed, founda-
tions will not fail due to changing circumstances. They will instead be
redirected. The careful donor will provide alternatives and/or will
explicitly grant greater trustee discretion if conditions change.
2. The Convergence of Cy Pres and Administrative Deviation
Critics of the threshold analysis may argue that it will lead to the
merger of cy pres and deviation into one doctrine. Some people
would consider this problematic, arguing that administrative devia-
tion is by definition a lesser alteration, and therefore should be held
to a lower standard of review. Moreover, critics might argue that such
a convergence would be problematic because administrative deviation
is a doctrine intended to promote the viability of specific donor in-
tent, whereas cy pres is intended to sustain the general intent of the
donor.
The threshold test would lead to some convergence of these two
doctrines. This convergence, however, appears necessary in light of
the historic applications of the two doctrines. Too often, there is con-
fusion as to which doctrine is applicable to a specific case. Too often,
one doctrine is used to further the agenda of trustees or courts, when
the other doctrine is actually appropriate. This move toward conver-
gence is a solution to these problems. By holding all deviation to the
same initial standard, the law will minimize the effects of using one
doctrine in place of another. This convergence is a recognition of
the difficulties inherent in distinguishing between the elements of a
donor's wishes that are merely administrative and the donor's actual
purpose.
CONCLUSION
The preservation of donor intent in charitable foundations de-
pends not on donors or the legal system, but on trustees. A donor
243 For further discussion of trust failure, see supra Part II.B.
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can only monitor her trustees while she is alive. The legal system can
only enforce donor intent when there is governmental interest in
bringing the matter to court."' The burden falls on trustees to moni-
tor themselves-to recognize that the only reason they are trustees of
a charitable foundation is because someone else donated her wealth to
the public welfare and designated them as legal guardians of that
wealth. Waldemar Nielsen appropriately concluded:
In the long term, the legitimacy of the institution of private philan-
thropy rests on the principle of trusteeship. Legally, the board of trus-
tees is the foundation .... It is to this group of private persons that the
donor "entrusts" his endowment, to be managed in accordance with his
wishes, and in whom society places its "trust" that the institution will be
m d fr t247managed for the public benefit.
246 Generally, only the state attorney general has supervisory power over enforce-
ment of a trust instrument. Moreover, the attorney general rarely exercises this right.
See FISCH ETAL., supra note 3, § 682, at 525. Donors, their heirs and the beneficiaries
of trusts have very little power to enforce or intervene in the enforcement of charita-
ble foundations. See id. § 717, at 559-60. The issue of standing to enforce donor intent
is a key one, but that is a topic for another Comment.
247 NIELSEN, supra note 150, at 313-14.
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